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• W2155331535 abstract "Voters who participate in elections to the European Parliament tend to use these elections to punish their domestic governing parties. Many students of the EU therefore claim that the party-political composition of the Parliament should systematically differ from that of the Council. This study, which compares empirically the party-political centers of gravity of these two central political actors, shows that opposed majorities between Council and Parliament may have other than simply electoral causes. The logic of domestic government formation works against the representation of politically more extreme parties, and hence against more EU-skeptic parties in the Council. At the same time, voters in EP elections vote more often for these more extreme and more EU-skeptic parties. The different locations of Council and Parliament in the pro-/contra-EU dimension may thus be caused by two – possibly interrelated – effects: a mechanical effect, due to the translation of votes into seats and then into 'office', and thus also into Council representation, and an electoral effect in elections to the European Parliament. The paper discusses the implications of this finding for our understanding of the political system of the EU and of its democratic legitimacy. Regelmasig scheinen Wahler Europawahlen dazu zu nutzen, ihre jeweilige nationale Regierung elektoral zu bestrafen. Viele Beobachter der Wahlen zum Europaischen Parlament gehen daher davon aus, dass die parteipolitische Ausrichtung des Parlaments systematisch von der des Ministerrats abweicht. Die vorliegende Analyse, die die parteipolitische Zusammensetzung dieser beiden zentralen europapolitischen Akteure empirisch vergleicht, zeigt, dass neben den elektoralen Ursachen auch andere Grunde fur gegenlaufige Mehrheiten zwischen Parlament und Rat verantwortlich sein konnen. Die Logik der Regierungsbildung auf nationalstaatlicher Ebene fuhrt dazu, dass zentristische und damit eher europafreundliche Parteien uberproportional stark im Rat vertreten sind. In Europawahlen hingegen geben Wahler haufig extremer positionierten, das heist auch europaskeptischeren Parteien ihre Stimme. Die politische Distanz zwischen Rat und Parlament resultiert in der Pro/contra-EU-Dimension daher aus dem Zusammenwirken zweier, moglicherweise miteinander verbundener Effekte: elektoralen und mechanischen Grunden fur divided government in Europa. Das Papier diskutiert die Implikationen dieses Befundes fur unser Verstandnis von der Funktionsweise der EU und ihrer demokratischen Legitimation." @default.
• W2155331535 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2155331535 date "2006-01-01" @default.
• W2155331535 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2155331535 title "Divided Government European Style? Electoral and Mechanical Causes of European Parliament and Council Divisions" @default.
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