Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2159089780> ?p ?o ?g. }
- W2159089780 abstract "Finance) Corporate Governance and Corporate Control: Evidence from Trading by Wady Haddaji Department of Business Administration Duke University Date: Approved: Simon Gervais, Co-Advisor Adriano Rampini, Co-Advisor Vish Viswanathan Mohan Venkatachalam An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Business Administration in the Graduate School of Duke University 2009 Copyright c © 2009 by Wady Haddaji All rights reserved Abstract In Chapter 1, I document a negative (positive) relationship between changes in large (small) blockholders’ ownership and abnormal returns. The evidence in this paper suggests that an increase in the relatively large blockholders’ ownership raises the consumption of private benefits while an increase in the relatively small blockholders’ ownership constrains large blockholders from expropriating minority shareholders. Moreover, I find an inversely U-shaped relationship between changes in the largest blockholders’ ownership and firm value. As large blockholders’ ownership and control increase, the negative effect of firm value driven by expropriating minority shareholders starts to exceed the incentive benefits of monitoring by the largest blockholder. I also show that the negative relationship between changes in institutional investors’ control and abnormal returns declines as analysts’ following increases. In Chapter 2, I study the role of trading as a governance mechanism. I hypothesize that governance through trading plays a significant monitoring role in practice and that engaging in “voice” and “exit” can be substitutes. I show that abnormal turnover following earnings announcements is significantly higher for firms with large institutional blockholders than for those with small individual shareholders. For firms with majority institutional ownership, I demonstrate that abnormal trading is higher for firms with multiple blockholders than for those with a single large blockholder and that abnormal trading increases with the number of institutional investors and declines with the percent of stocks owned by the largest institutional investor. Moreover, this excess trading is driven by mutual fund investors, which are non-interventionist and thus are more likely to engage in “exit” than “voice”. I also show that for firms with large institutional blockholders, abnormal trading following public announcements increases with liquidity. ivIn Chapter 1, I document a negative (positive) relationship between changes in large (small) blockholders’ ownership and abnormal returns. The evidence in this paper suggests that an increase in the relatively large blockholders’ ownership raises the consumption of private benefits while an increase in the relatively small blockholders’ ownership constrains large blockholders from expropriating minority shareholders. Moreover, I find an inversely U-shaped relationship between changes in the largest blockholders’ ownership and firm value. As large blockholders’ ownership and control increase, the negative effect of firm value driven by expropriating minority shareholders starts to exceed the incentive benefits of monitoring by the largest blockholder. I also show that the negative relationship between changes in institutional investors’ control and abnormal returns declines as analysts’ following increases. In Chapter 2, I study the role of trading as a governance mechanism. I hypothesize that governance through trading plays a significant monitoring role in practice and that engaging in “voice” and “exit” can be substitutes. I show that abnormal turnover following earnings announcements is significantly higher for firms with large institutional blockholders than for those with small individual shareholders. For firms with majority institutional ownership, I demonstrate that abnormal trading is higher for firms with multiple blockholders than for those with a single large blockholder and that abnormal trading increases with the number of institutional investors and declines with the percent of stocks owned by the largest institutional investor. Moreover, this excess trading is driven by mutual fund investors, which are non-interventionist and thus are more likely to engage in “exit” than “voice”. I also show that for firms with large institutional blockholders, abnormal trading following public announcements increases with liquidity. iv" @default.
- W2159089780 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2159089780 creator A5024298746 @default.
- W2159089780 date "2009-01-01" @default.
- W2159089780 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
- W2159089780 title "Corporate Governance and Corporate Control: Evidence from Trading" @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1485044580 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1494703832 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1516407584 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1544617770 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W154808641 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1550695802 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1563323840 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1605684110 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1606272114 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1965891660 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1971416244 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1971926591 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1979927021 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1986677745 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W1993981983 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2000934241 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2014182748 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2016020734 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2017752325 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2023220564 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2031796872 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2033041791 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2051140949 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2051550839 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2055418603 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2059755087 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2063126268 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2068518527 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2076778835 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2078838966 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2100970045 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2111230345 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2122753608 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2124701251 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2135241016 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2136164601 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2146456138 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2163685283 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2164741508 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2165723500 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2566856888 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2605901361 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2752617332 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3121471642 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3121572167 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3121693921 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3122199046 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3122859634 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3123446927 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3123556813 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3123748565 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3123852583 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3123857648 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124164275 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124477224 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124525953 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124559386 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124598916 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124747412 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3124859647 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3125062157 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W3125845135 @default.
- W2159089780 cites W2107735123 @default.
- W2159089780 hasPublicationYear "2009" @default.
- W2159089780 type Work @default.
- W2159089780 sameAs 2159089780 @default.
- W2159089780 citedByCount "0" @default.
- W2159089780 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
- W2159089780 hasAuthorship W2159089780A5024298746 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C119857082 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C206757995 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C2775924081 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C2776291640 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C2781426361 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C34447519 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C41008148 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConcept C556758197 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C10138342 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C119857082 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C120757647 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C121955636 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C144133560 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C162324750 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C187736073 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C206757995 @default.
- W2159089780 hasConceptScore W2159089780C2775924081 @default.