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- W2163141303 endingPage "459" @default.
- W2163141303 startingPage "440" @default.
- W2163141303 abstract "Abstract Manuscript Type Empirical Research Question/Issue This study examines whether and how controlling shareholders collude with managers with respect to tunneling. Research Findings/Insights Using data from C hinese listed companies, we find evidence consistent with the collusion hypothesis. Specifically, we find that the separation of control and cash flow rights is negatively associated with managerial pay‐performance and turnover‐performance sensitivity. These results suggest that controlling shareholders with excess control rights collude with managers by weakening performance‐based incentives. Further evidence suggests that the negative relation between excess control rights and performance‐based incentives is more pronounced in less profitable and less promising firms. We also find preliminary evidence for rent‐sharing behavior between controlling shareholders and managers. Theoretic/Academic Implications We incorporate the influence of managers into the agency framework between controlling and minority shareholders and suggest that controlling shareholders and managers expropriate the minority shareholders. We also propose that excess control rights undermine normal, effective, performance‐based incentives and induce rent‐sharing behavior between controlling shareholders and managers. Practitioner/Policy Implications We advise firms' stakeholders, especially minority shareholders, to detect tunneling by observing executive incentives. We suggest that policy makers pay particular attention to the collusion between tunneling participants rather than merely prohibiting certain tunneling tactics. We also recommend that regulators strengthen corporate governance norms and improve the corporate governance environment." @default.
- W2163141303 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2163141303 creator A5008999313 @default.
- W2163141303 creator A5010106832 @default.
- W2163141303 creator A5019359168 @default.
- W2163141303 creator A5081471858 @default.
- W2163141303 date "2014-08-28" @default.
- W2163141303 modified "2023-10-14" @default.
- W2163141303 title "Controlling Shareholder-Manager Collusion and Tunneling: Evidence from China" @default.
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