FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2164375229> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2164375229 endingPage "445" @default.
• W2164375229 startingPage "413" @default.
• W2164375229 abstract "In spite of the recent failure of two referendums, the drafting of a constitution for the second biggest economic power in the world, the European Union (EU), remains a major event in the history of European integration. Whether the constitution or a revised version of it will come into force or not, several important questions emerge. How did an increased number of twentyfive member states reach a conclusion, whereas a lower number of fifteen had failed at previous intergovernmental attempts? In particular, how did the constitutional convention differ from previous intergovernmental conferences (iGCs) at which the EU exclusively bargained its treaty documents in the past? How can one explain the outcomes of the convention, which proposes redistribution of power and resources among twenty-five or more member states? This article uses the positions of the delegates of the EU's constitutional convention to examine bargaining in a setting with few formal rules. The authors use theoretical insights from a spatial model and new survey data to determine the implicit voting rule used at the convention. They find that the convention differed from previous IGCs because the convention was governed by consensus, whereas previous EU bargains on treaties had always required unanimous support. The level of consensus was higher than simple majority rule but lower than unanimity. Since this threshold impacted who won and who lost at the convention, the authors also examine the sources of bargaining power, such as delegates' distance to the status quo, distance to the median, population size, and domestic constraints. The results confirm several findings in the EU bargaining and two-level game literature, for example, that actors closer to the status quo hold a stronger bargaining position and that actors from larger member states are neither more likely nor less likely to win at the negotiating table than are actors from smaller states. The findings on the irrelevance of domestic constraints also indicate why the popular votes in France and the Netherlands failed." @default.
• W2164375229 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2164375229 creator A5006492459 @default.
• W2164375229 creator A5053607260 @default.
• W2164375229 date "2006-04-01" @default.
• W2164375229 modified "2023-10-18" @default.
• W2164375229 title "From Unanimity to Consensus: An Analysis of the Negotiations at the EU's Constitutional Convention" @default.
• W2164375229 cites W1572634385 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W1964926481 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W1977215000 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W1988151259 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W1991432919 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2000325375 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2029344308 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2034822071 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2045354923 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2052954941 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2072244652 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2080995090 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2089062309 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2091364579 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2093682006 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2095460614 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2101586208 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2108378466 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2109015651 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2111633227 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2117367444 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2124857988 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2126294838 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2130600069 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2135207948 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2135438163 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2141762014 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2151036724 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2153031274 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2153836813 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2154937320 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2166775954 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2168119403 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2168629529 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2326939140 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2327018637 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W2332896953 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W3123681521 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W4247283281 @default.
• W2164375229 cites W574026539 @default.
• W2164375229 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2007.0002" @default.
• W2164375229 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
• W2164375229 type Work @default.
• W2164375229 sameAs 2164375229 @default.
• W2164375229 citedByCount "39" @default.
• W2164375229 countsByYear W21643752292013 @default.
• W2164375229 countsByYear W21643752292014 @default.
• W2164375229 countsByYear W21643752292016 @default.
• W2164375229 countsByYear W21643752292018 @default.
• W2164375229 countsByYear W21643752292021 @default.
• W2164375229 countsByYear W21643752292023 @default.
• W2164375229 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2164375229 hasAuthorship W2164375229A5006492459 @default.
• W2164375229 hasAuthorship W2164375229A5053607260 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C149923435 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C153668964 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C199776023 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C2776154427 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C2779010840 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C2780608745 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C2781423480 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C2908647359 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C520049643 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C144024400 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C149923435 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C153668964 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C162324750 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C17744445 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C190253527 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C199539241 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C199776023 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C2776154427 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C2779010840 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C2780608745 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C2781423480 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C2908647359 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C520049643 @default.
• W2164375229 hasConceptScore W2164375229C94625758 @default.
• W2164375229 hasIssue "3" @default.
• W2164375229 hasLocation W21643752291 @default.
• W2164375229 hasOpenAccess W2164375229 @default.
• W2164375229 hasPrimaryLocation W21643752291 @default.
• W2164375229 hasRelatedWork W186260689 @default.
• W2164375229 hasRelatedWork W1996872052 @default.
• W2164375229 hasRelatedWork W2211624284 @default.

• next