FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2164752186> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2164752186 endingPage "36" @default.
• W2164752186 startingPage "1" @default.
• W2164752186 abstract "A credible opposition is necessary for democratic accountability. However, in a multiparty democracy, a credible opposition may fail to emerge when it is in the strategic interest of political parties to collude rather than compete, effectively extinguishing all credible opposition. The author argues that illicit collusion among parties on a representative council is more likely when all viable parties win seats and are thus able to enter into a self-binding commitment to jointly engage in misconduct without risk of exposure. Conversely, when at least one party fails to win representation on the council, there is a credible opposition with the incentive and ability to threaten exposure of rent seeking among council members. The theory is tested using a regression discontinuity design where the electoral threshold to win a single seat is, within a narrow band, an exogenous determinant of whether or not there is an out-party or credible opposition. Exploiting the fact that Mali's decentralization produces within-country variation in both electoral and governance outcomes, the author uses data from commune council elections alongside local-level public goods provision as a measure of rent seeking. Poorer public goods provision is indeed more likely when all political parties in a district win seats on the council. To show that collusion is the mechanism driving this relationship, the author tests several observable implications in the data and uses qualitative evidence as illustration. This examination of when it is in the strategic interest of parties to engage in uncompetitive behavior contributes to the literature on when elections fail to produce democratic accountability." @default.
• W2164752186 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2164752186 creator A5000705574 @default.
• W2164752186 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W2164752186 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W2164752186 title "The Logic of Party Collusion in a Democracy: Evidence from Mali" @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1485991056 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1486785686 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1501990274 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1502532850 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1506671858 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1528566708 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1535643370 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1543247094 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1564259299 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W157449371 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1925504877 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1970309718 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1973664891 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1976528234 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1976631032 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1986592472 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W1990889500 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2029126207 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2056552158 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2066741696 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2083277050 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2098615895 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2121496346 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2121753222 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2126889012 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2127546927 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2135266402 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2140409505 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2143584325 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2145542285 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2161909283 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2165018077 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2252597536 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W2324656367 @default.
• W2164752186 cites W3123266431 @default.
• W2164752186 doi "https://doi.org/10.1017/s004388711400032x" @default.
• W2164752186 hasPublicationYear "2015" @default.
• W2164752186 type Work @default.
• W2164752186 sameAs 2164752186 @default.
• W2164752186 citedByCount "21" @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862017 @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862018 @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862019 @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862020 @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862021 @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862022 @default.
• W2164752186 countsByYear W21647521862023 @default.
• W2164752186 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2164752186 hasAuthorship W2164752186A5000705574 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C138921699 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C2776007630 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C2780668109 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C2781198186 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C34447519 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C555826173 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C100001284 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C10138342 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C138921699 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C162324750 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C175444787 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C17744445 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C199539241 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C2776007630 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C2780668109 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C2781198186 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C29122968 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C34447519 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C39389867 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C555826173 @default.
• W2164752186 hasConceptScore W2164752186C94625758 @default.
• W2164752186 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W2164752186 hasLocation W21647521861 @default.
• W2164752186 hasOpenAccess W2164752186 @default.
• W2164752186 hasPrimaryLocation W21647521861 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W1491837399 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W1566165015 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W1577985456 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W2009938035 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W2029078746 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W2040599222 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W2053965941 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W2165633391 @default.
• W2164752186 hasRelatedWork W3122232980 @default.

• next