FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W217631349> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W217631349 endingPage "444" @default.
• W217631349 startingPage "391" @default.
• W217631349 abstract "ABSTRACT Existing legal and economic theory presumes a clear line between private firms and government regulating agencies. It generally assumes that corporations maximize profit in the factor markets and government regulators alleviate externalities in those markets. The circumstances of the financial crisis of 2008 have altered this existing dynamic. As a result of the bailout, the government now holds a controlling equity interest in many of the nation's largest financial and automotive companies. As a prime example, the government owns a 34% voting, and thereby effectively controlling, equity interest in Citigroup, the nation's largest bank. This Article examines economic theory and evidence of government ownership in private firms and finds that government ownership and control correlates with overwhelming costs to firm efficiency as governments push the firms they control to subsidize influential interest groups. As the government does not want to lose its ability to subsidize these groups, the usual product markets and the market for corporate control that would otherwise maintain profitable enterprises are largely muted. Part of the explanation for the government's interest in using its control over private firms to serve interest groups is the government's ability to do so off-budget. As such, this Article argues that laws governing the debt ceiling of the United States and the financial statements of the United States should be changed to take into account a realistic perspective of the government's obligations that accompany its ownership in private firms through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) bailout. This perspective should consolidate the financial position of firms controlled by the U.S. government, including their debt, net revenue, and other financial operations, into the financial systems and laws which govern the approval process and disclosure of the U.S. government's finances. In doing so, this Article argues that the reforms proposed can partially internalize the costs of interest group pressure to abuse the government's ownership and can also facilitate the legislature's constitutional requirement to oversee appropriations and debt repayment of the United States. As a secondary thesis, this Article argues that consolidation of the controlled firms will also present a more accurate picture to users of government financial statements. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION 393 II. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF COMPANIES UNDER THE TARP BAILOUT 397 A. History of the TARP Bailout 397 B. The Government's Control Through TARP 399 III. ECONOMIC THEORY AND EVIDENCE OF GOVERNMENT-OWNED COMPANIES 403 A. Theory of Government Owned Firms 405 B. Evidence of Government Owned Firms 410 IV. INTERNATIONAL BUDGETARY LAW AND ACCOUNTING APPROACHES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS 416 V. STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION FOR THE NATIONAL DEBT CEILING 421 VI. THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES ........ 430 A. Economists as Users of Financial Statements 439 VII. CONCLUSION 442 I. INTRODUCTION The essence of finance is the art of balancing equity and debt to fund the production of the goods and services that drive economic growth. This system presumes the existence of two distinct institutions. The first institution is a collection of firms owned by diversified residual equity holders that manage productive resources with a streamlined objective of maximizing shareholder wealth. …" @default.
• W217631349 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W217631349 creator A5051802327 @default.
• W217631349 date "2011-03-01" @default.
• W217631349 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W217631349 title "Separation of Bank and State: Consolidating Bailed-Out Companies into the U.S. Debt Ceiling and Government Financial Statements" @default.
• W217631349 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
• W217631349 type Work @default.
• W217631349 sameAs 217631349 @default.
• W217631349 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W217631349 countsByYear W2176313492015 @default.
• W217631349 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W217631349 hasAuthorship W217631349A5051802327 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C120527767 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C139719470 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C199728807 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C2778300220 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C2779775300 @default.
• W217631349 hasConcept C73283319 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C10138342 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C120527767 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C139719470 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C144133560 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C162324750 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C17744445 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C199539241 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C199728807 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C2778300220 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C2779775300 @default.
• W217631349 hasConceptScore W217631349C73283319 @default.
• W217631349 hasIssue "2" @default.
• W217631349 hasLocation W2176313491 @default.
• W217631349 hasOpenAccess W217631349 @default.
• W217631349 hasPrimaryLocation W2176313491 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W1496533166 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W1583377623 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2008370505 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2040914979 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2139349353 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2141720934 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2170450021 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2316950944 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2369836086 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2398852002 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W2746488905 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3121293233 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3121902035 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3122024458 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3123652345 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3123805642 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3124369418 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3125894657 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W3150513053 @default.
• W217631349 hasRelatedWork W579746460 @default.
• W217631349 hasVolume "2011" @default.
• W217631349 isParatext "false" @default.
• W217631349 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W217631349 magId "217631349" @default.
• W217631349 workType "article" @default.