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• W219083634 abstract "The Army's new and lighter brigade, the interim brigade combat team (IBCT), is being designed to improve strategic mobility and quick response to potential trouble spots in any operational theater. As with any force structure change, the tradeoffs among combat effectiveness, sustainability and deployability are manifold and complex, rarely leading directly to a perfect solution. As Army force designers begin to move away from the heavy force to a more deployable and sustainable one, they will also balance weapons system range, accuracy and lethality with force effectiveness and vulnerability. IBCT designers face diverse tradeoffs as they attempt to achieve the responsiveness essential for accomplishing strategic objectives. Getting to a crisis area rapidly is only the beginning; survival and success constitute the deployed IBCT's ultimate mission. To survive, the IBCT must operate and fight with significantly more finesse and agility than its heavy counterparts would have to under similar deployed conditions. It cannot win decisively by virtue of the tons of depleted-uranium projectiles and high-explosive rounds it delivers, by the thickness of its armor or by the months of logistic backup it has pre-positioned. To fight smart, the medium weight force needs to take a fresh look at military operations-warfighting in particular. Each principle of war needs to be re-examined, unconstrained by today's biases and pro forma approaches to military operations. Maneuver commanders have long taught tank and tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missile (TOW) crews to look for enemy vehicles presenting specific radio or radar antennae arrays and to engage them on sight. Forward observers were similarly instructed. By taking out these command and control (CZ) and fire direction vehicles. forces cut the flow of information to the opposing commander, reduce the effectiveness of enemy fires and limit the opponent's ability to maneuver his force. Even with heavy brigades, there has never been an absolute benefit of force-on-force slugfests; rather, flanking maneuvers, tactical deception and ambushes can be more efficient offensive and defensive measures. Such practices are a simple form of information operations (IO) at the tactical level. Forces can dominate the battlefield by fully integrating every element of available combat power, including those often cast aside as unnecessary by current heavy forces. Today's emerging IO concepts invite the Army to view military operations as the art of winning by placing the enemy at such a decisive disadvantage that he can no longer remain on the battlefield. Done well, a nearly bloodless victory may be possible well before a full-scale conflict begins. TO can reduce the probability of a close and prolonged ens gagement where even the winner loses. Brigade-level IO is especially appealing because it is simple and straightforward, placing few demands on the commander and staff, and the effects are relatively easy to assess. The challenge is to explore the less-traditional avenues available to influence the enemy, specifically the enemy decision maker responsible for the local battle. At the lower tactical levels, the task is very direct: either shut down or alter the enemy's information flow, cause him to doubt his ability to win, then destroy him and his staff. Fully integrating IO with fire and maneuver (or with the threat of fire and maneuver) significantly increases the probability of success on terms favoring the friendly force. The starting point for any excursion into the world of IO must be tactical intelligence. Unfortunately, tactical forces tend to focus nearly exclusively on the kinetic energy solution set, thereby narrowing an intelligence analyst's view of the enemy. Successful intelligence products in today's Army revolve around depicting the finite locations of enemy tanks and artillery pieces, and portraying what enemy maneuver forces are doing. …" @default.
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• W219083634 date "2000-09-01" @default.
• W219083634 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W219083634 title "Information Operations and the IBCT" @default.
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