FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2198032813> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2198032813 endingPage "1077" @default.
• W2198032813 startingPage "1075" @default.
• W2198032813 abstract "State representation is fundamental to behavior. However, identifying the true state of the world is challenging when explicit cues are ambiguous. Here, Bradfield and colleagues show that the medial OFC is critical for using associative information to discriminate ambiguous states. State representation is fundamental to behavior. However, identifying the true state of the world is challenging when explicit cues are ambiguous. Here, Bradfield and colleagues show that the medial OFC is critical for using associative information to discriminate ambiguous states. Some decisions are easy: you go at a green light, you stop at red. Those two states of the world are clearly different, signaling different appropriate behaviors. However, sometimes you stop even at a green light—for instance, you are going left and first need to give right-of-way to oncoming traffic. Here, the state of “green light and I intend to go left” is different from “green light and I intend to go straight,” despite the two states being perceptually identical. Appropriate state representation is fundamental to behavioral flexibility—by abstracting away superfluous information (whether the oncoming car is black or gray, are pedestrians crossing the street on your right) and adding in important unobservable information (your intention, your past actions, your knowledge of traffic rules), the brain can craft a “task state” that is ideal for rapid, correct, and generalizable decision making. However, identifying the “true” state can be particularly challenging when explicit cues are ambiguous and the candidate states imply contradictory rules. For example, a soldier returning from deployment must be able to categorize the wartime setting differently from similar civilian contexts to avoid inappropriate behavioral responses. While there are often explicit or observable cues that distinguish these states, this is not always the case; given enough abstraction, the distinction between Bagdad and Baltimore may become difficult, and largely a matter of an internal belief. It is critical that the neural representation of this belief be able to bridge the gaps between observable distinguishing events, as dysfunction in this process, even if very brief, could contribute to phenomena such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Given the importance of task state information for decision making and learning, and for disturbances thereof, it is of interest to identify the neural substrates mediating the ability to recognize, maintain, and deploy state representations. We have recently proposed that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) might be one key area involved in this process (Takahashi et al., 2011Takahashi Y.K. Roesch M.R. Wilson R.C. Toreson K. O’Donnell P. Niv Y. Schoenbaum G. Nat. Neurosci. 2011; 14: 1590-1597Crossref PubMed Scopus (185) Google Scholar, Wilson et al., 2014Wilson R.C. Takahashi Y.K. Schoenbaum G. Niv Y. Neuron. 2014; 81: 267-279Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (473) Google Scholar). In particular, we suggested that the OFC is critical for representing and using states that include components that are not externally observable. In the current issue of Neuron, Bradfield et al., 2015Bradfield L.A. Dezfouli A. van Holstein M. Chieng B. Balleine B.W. Neuron. 2015; 88 (this issue): 1268-1280Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (123) Google Scholar elegantly explore this possibility, focusing specifically on the role of the medial OFC in supporting goal-directed behavior that depends on a “forward search” over potential upcoming (and currently unobservable) task states. In a series of experiments, they test whether the medial OFC contributes to the ability to predict that a particular state is forthcoming when the critical defining information—a predicted food outcome—is not available in the physical environment but can only be inferred from learned associations. For example, in one experiment two cues predicted delivery of two different foods to rats. The rats also learned that two distinct actions—pressing a left or a right lever—could, with some probability, produce these foods. Once each of these associations had been trained independently, rats were given a choice test in which both levers were available. When one of the cues was turned on, the rats increased their press rate on the lever that had produced the food predicted by that cue, as if anticipation of the food increased the value of the action associated with that outcome. This occurred even though food was not actually present at any point in the test. This bias in action selection is consistent with an association between the actions and specific future outcome states and with the operation of two internal states or beliefs that each food is more likely available under certain circumstances: the presence of the cue that previously signaled its delivery. Rats with lesions of the medial OFC, in contrast, failed to show this selective bias, increasing instead their press rates on both levers, regardless of which cue was present. In itself, this result is amenable to a number of interpretations: perhaps the medial OFC is necessary for rats to learn to associate each lever with a specific food outcome (Klein-Flügge et al., 2013Klein-Flügge M.C. Barron H.C. Brodersen K.H. Dolan R.J. Behrens T.E.J. J. Neurosci. 2013; 33: 3202-3211Crossref PubMed Scopus (95) Google Scholar), or for associations between cues and outcomes to affect instrumental actions (Colwill and Rescorla, 1990Colwill R.M. Rescorla R.A. J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 1990; 16: 40-47Crossref PubMed Scopus (108) Google Scholar), or for rats to be able to internally simulate the currently unobservable forward-consequences of their actions (Wilson et al., 2014Wilson R.C. Takahashi Y.K. Schoenbaum G. Niv Y. Neuron. 2014; 81: 267-279Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (473) Google Scholar, Doll et al., 2015Doll B.D. Duncan K.D. Simon D.A. Shohamy D. Daw N.D. Nat. Neurosci. 2015; 18: 767-772Crossref PubMed Scopus (167) Google Scholar). Using a series of follow-up experiments, including manipulations that disable the medial OFC only temporarily at test (after allowing for normal learning), Bradfield et al., 2015Bradfield L.A. Dezfouli A. van Holstein M. Chieng B. Balleine B.W. Neuron. 2015; 88 (this issue): 1268-1280Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (123) Google Scholar mount a convincing case for the third interpretation—if outcomes are available in the environment, animals can plan actions appropriately even without the medial OFC, but when outcomes are absent and appropriate behavior requires internal state information, the medial OFC is key. In a final experiment consisting of creative animal-theory acrobatics, Bradfield et al., 2015Bradfield L.A. Dezfouli A. van Holstein M. Chieng B. Balleine B.W. Neuron. 2015; 88 (this issue): 1268-1280Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (123) Google Scholar set forth to show that the medial OFC has a specific role in contributing to the use of unobservable information to generate task states. In this experiment, animals were trained that each of two cues predicts a specific cue reward, and each of two actions predict the cues. As in typical conditioned reinforcement experiments, when actions were performed, the cues appeared but no food reward was given. One consequence of this setup is that animals can learn that action A1 is inhibitory—it predicts the absence of an otherwise expected outcome. In a later stage, the action A1 led to the same cue S1, but this time with reward available. If the medial OFC is necessary only for inferring states on the basis of unobservable information, rats with medial OFC lesions should still be able to learn the associations inherent in the rewarded state but show a selective deficit in forming inhibitory associations in the unrewarded state. To test this prediction, in a test phase, the authors gave rats a choice between the two actions A1 and A2, this time with both actions leading to cue S1 (and no reward). The absence of reward was intended to invoke the inhibitory association: in this context, the A1-S1 combination should be inhibitory and thus undesirable. Rats should therefore prefer to perform A2, as it leads to S1, which may still conceivably lead to reward. However, if medial OFC lesions render rats unable to learn the inhibitory relationship, lesioned rats should prefer the A1-S1 combination that had been previously rewarded to the unknown A2-S1 combination. This was indeed what the behavioral results showed: intact rats responded by choosing the novel combination, essentially inferring the unavailability of reward for the previously trained action in this state, while rats with medial OFC lesions showed the opposite bias. In other words, rats with medial OFC actively pursued performance of the action that they should have known was counterproductive to acquiring food if they had been able to use the unobservable outcome to infer the unrewarded state. The authors argue that this experiment clearly showed that rats without medial OFC function are not necessarily impaired at forming states per se; rather they were selectively unable to form a novel state on the basis of unobservable information. The intricacy of the studies conducted by Bradfield et al., 2015Bradfield L.A. Dezfouli A. van Holstein M. Chieng B. Balleine B.W. Neuron. 2015; 88 (this issue): 1268-1280Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (123) Google Scholar presents us with formidable evidence that the medial OFC contributes to the ability to use inferred but unobservable outcomes to generate internal states. But a state space theoretically includes all aspects of the current environment, not just information about outcomes or consequences. The importance of this broader conceptualization is evident in past work from this lab (Bradfield et al., 2013Bradfield L.A. Bertran-Gonzalez J. Chieng B. Balleine B.W. Neuron. 2013; 79: 153-166Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (189) Google Scholar). In that study, they reported that silencing of cholinergic interneurons in the dorsomedial striatum (DMS) caused a selective deficit in the ability of rats to appropriately segregate new learning to a new state of the task. Importantly, although both the current and earlier experiments speak to the importance of state representations to flexible behavior, the impairment found in the earlier study was qualitatively different from the impairment observed in the current experiments. Unlike rats lacking medial OFC, rats lacking cholinergic function in the DMS were not impaired in using unobservable outcomes to influence action selection—in fact they were perfectly able to choose an action on the basis of an inferred outcome. However, these rats were unable to maintain appropriate responding when the contingencies were changed and a new state had to be inferred. Instead, the rats appeared to combine the learning from the two episodes as if they lacked the ability to create different conceptual states entirely (Schoenbaum et al., 2013Schoenbaum G. Stalnaker T.A. Niv Y. Neuron. 2013; 79: 3-6Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (14) Google Scholar). While this deficit differs from the effects of medial OFC damage reported here, it is remarkably similar to the effects of damage to the lateral OFC, which are often not evident until contingencies change (Ostlund and Balleine, 2007Ostlund S.B. Balleine B.W. J. Neurosci. 2007; 27: 4819-4825Crossref PubMed Scopus (266) Google Scholar, Riceberg and Shapiro, 2012Riceberg J.S. Shapiro M.L. J. Neurosci. 2012; 32: 16402-16409Crossref PubMed Scopus (54) Google Scholar, Schoenbaum et al., 2002Schoenbaum G. Nugent S.L. Saddoris M.P. Setlow B. Neuroreport. 2002; 13: 885-890Crossref PubMed Scopus (276) Google Scholar). Future work may find that all the factors that contribute to a conceptualization of state are not localized within one region of the OFC. Rather, the OFC may function as a wider network to promote a high-dimensional state representation capable of tagging distinct associations developed in downstream structures. What begins to emerge from these recent studies is a complex system capable of placing distinct memories within a broader representation or cognitive map of the world (Tolman, 1948Tolman E.C. Psychol. Rev. 1948; 55: 189-208Crossref PubMed Scopus (3681) Google Scholar). The importance of these broader maps is a challenge to existing, more simplistic frameworks that are often applied to understand how the brain regulates complex associative behavior. For example, we began by noting the potential importance of state to understanding phenomena like PTSD. Existing therapeutic approaches emphasize extinction of the fear-producing memory. Yet an appreciation of the contribution of prediction errors to segregating learning between different inferred states (Gershman et al., 2010Gershman S.J. Blei D.M. Niv Y. Psychol. Rev. 2010; 117: 197-209Crossref PubMed Scopus (216) Google Scholar) indicates that for extinction to be effective it must be conducted under circumstances—a state—similar to the original learning, otherwise the relevant associative rules will not be accessed and modified by the extinction training (Gershman et al., 2013Gershman S.J. Jones C.E. Norman K.A. Monfils M.H. Niv Y. Front. Behav. Neurosci. 2013; 7: 164-170Crossref PubMed Scopus (85) Google Scholar). Beyond this, it is worth considering that PTSD may be the result of a very transient failure in the ability to maintain the appropriate state representation. Such a brief failure could lead to the emotional responses that characterize PTSD even in the absence of any underlying abnormalities in the learning and extinction processes. In the end, it may be simpler to strengthen state representations than to extinguish or “erase” the underlying memories. Importantly, the clinical implications of state are not limited to PTSD. Rather, this framework may help to explain the persistent ability of environmental stimuli to control adverse behaviors in many disorders, such as drug addiction or other anxiety disorders. Studies such as Bradfield et al., 2015Bradfield L.A. Dezfouli A. van Holstein M. Chieng B. Balleine B.W. Neuron. 2015; 88 (this issue): 1268-1280Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (123) Google Scholar demonstrate the importance of using sophisticated learning paradigms to understand these disorders and the neural circuitry that promote them. Medial Orbitofrontal Cortex Mediates Outcome Retrieval in Partially Observable Task SituationsBradfield et al.NeuronNovember 25, 2015In BriefChoice between actions often requires the ability to retrieve action consequences in circumstances where they are only partially observable. Here, Bradfield et al. demonstrate that this critical determinant of decision-making depends specifically on the medial orbitofrontal cortex in rats. Full-Text PDF Open Archive" @default.
• W2198032813 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2198032813 creator A5030822295 @default.
• W2198032813 creator A5047007314 @default.
• W2198032813 creator A5055862445 @default.
• W2198032813 creator A5085913856 @default.
• W2198032813 date "2015-12-01" @default.
• W2198032813 modified "2023-10-13" @default.
• W2198032813 title "The State of the Orbitofrontal Cortex" @default.
• W2198032813 cites W1969539518 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W1993230606 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2000214310 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2010860074 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2028384357 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2065173888 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2083022530 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2086710210 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2089759189 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2110472469 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2119259385 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2161046428 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2161565319 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W2173749165 @default.
• W2198032813 cites W4298065609 @default.
• W2198032813 doi "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2015.12.004" @default.
• W2198032813 hasPubMedCentralId "https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/5541257" @default.
• W2198032813 hasPubMedId "https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26687216" @default.
• W2198032813 hasPublicationYear "2015" @default.
• W2198032813 type Work @default.
• W2198032813 sameAs 2198032813 @default.
• W2198032813 citedByCount "18" @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132016 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132017 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132018 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132019 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132020 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132021 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132022 @default.
• W2198032813 countsByYear W21980328132023 @default.
• W2198032813 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2198032813 hasAuthorship W2198032813A5030822295 @default.
• W2198032813 hasAuthorship W2198032813A5047007314 @default.
• W2198032813 hasAuthorship W2198032813A5055862445 @default.
• W2198032813 hasAuthorship W2198032813A5085913856 @default.
• W2198032813 hasBestOaLocation W21980328131 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConcept C169760540 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConcept C169900460 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConcept C2776559556 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConcept C2777348757 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConcept C2781195155 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConceptScore W2198032813C15744967 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConceptScore W2198032813C169760540 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConceptScore W2198032813C169900460 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConceptScore W2198032813C2776559556 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConceptScore W2198032813C2777348757 @default.
• W2198032813 hasConceptScore W2198032813C2781195155 @default.
• W2198032813 hasIssue "6" @default.
• W2198032813 hasLocation W21980328131 @default.
• W2198032813 hasLocation W21980328132 @default.
• W2198032813 hasLocation W21980328133 @default.
• W2198032813 hasLocation W21980328134 @default.
• W2198032813 hasOpenAccess W2198032813 @default.
• W2198032813 hasPrimaryLocation W21980328131 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W1739853412 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W2029799787 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W2030114605 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W2030904969 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W2103802045 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W2132132103 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W2791690085 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W3116289049 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W4280550147 @default.
• W2198032813 hasRelatedWork W4283750239 @default.
• W2198032813 hasVolume "88" @default.
• W2198032813 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2198032813 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2198032813 magId "2198032813" @default.
• W2198032813 workType "article" @default.