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• W2200471182 abstract "Since the end of the Cold War, India has been very much in the ascendant, not only economicallyand technologically, but also from the military and political point of view. Manyobservers are therefore already talking about a world power of the 21st century emergingon the Indian sub-continent. It is not surprising, therefore, that India is playing anincreasingly important role in the foreign and security policy considerations of the UnitedStates, the world’s only remaining superpower.Their respective size, power and geostrategic position mean that bilateral relations betweenthe world’s most mighty and the world’s most populous democracy are a significantfactor for the future world order. Central questions which are relevant for worldpolitics are common positions with regard to the “war on terror”, on the one hand, anddifferences over the legitimacy of armed intervention in the sovereignty of other states, onthe other. The long-term characteristics of their respective foreign and security policiesare particularly noticeable in the attitude of the two states towards international law (inthe context of war and peace), perhaps one of the most important instruments for protectingand shaping the global order.Despite common political values such as democracy, pluralism and rule of law, the relationshipbetween the United States and India during the East-West conflict and in thefollowing few years was characterized by alienation rather than friendship. India, whichhad had to struggle for its independence from Great Britain, looked on uneasily as theUnited States took on the legacy of the former colonial powers within the framework of itsanti-communist foreign policy (for example in Vietnam) and supported coups to overthrowdemocratically elected governments in South and Central America. On the other hand, NewDelhi’s reputation suffered significantly in Washington as a result of India’s role as a leaderof the Non-Aligned Movement and its proximity to the socialist economic model of theformer Soviet Union. The “thaw” did not begin until India started to gradually open up itseconomic system in the early nineties. Paradoxically, following initial U.S. sanctions, India’snuclear tests in 1998 also prompted a positive re-assessment of India’s role in Americanforeign and security policy. From then onwards, the relationship improved noticeablyand assumed a new strategic character following the events of 11 September 2001.India has been the target of terrorist aggression since it was founded in 1947. The biggestproblem for New Delhi in the meantime is transnational Islamist terrorism. Anti-Indian, militant Islamic fundamentalism is nourished primarily by the continuing Indian-Pakistani conflict over the Kashmir region. This has led to three wars (1947/48, 1965,1999) between the two neighbouring nuclear powers, also bringing them to the verge ofnuclear war in 1990, 1999 and 2001/2002. It is not surprising therefore that India takes akeen interest in the fight against terrorism and in international cooperation which servesthis goal.The attacks of 11 September 2001 suddenly provided India with an opportunity to closeranks with the world’s largest military power on the basis of converging interests. Indiaoffered the United States its full and unreserved support in the “war on terror” in an unprecedented declaration of solidarity. Shortly afterwards, U.S. President Bush and theIndian Prime Minister Vajpayee described in a joint declaration the common war on terroras the mainspring of their countries’ mutual relations. When the Indian sub-continentwas hit by a new wave of terrorism from Pakistan in 2001/2002, the United States increasinglysupported the Indian position and exercised tremendous political pressure on its allyPakistan, despite the fact that it urgently needed Pakistan’s support in the fight against theTaliban regime in Afghanistan. All things considered, the Indian Government’s decision toside with the United States in the fight against transnational terrorism can be regarded as apolitical success. For the first time, the United States described the elections in Jammu andKashmir in autumn 2002 as “free and fair”, and called upon the Pakistani Government toput an end to transnational terrorism emanating from its territory. Moreover, the antiterrorismalliance, which was forged following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and wasfurther consolidated in the course of the wave of terror in India in 2001/2002, prepared theground for expanding bilateral relations between Washington and New Delhi in otherfields.As a result, both states have not only expanded their trade relations spectacularly inrecent years, but have also intensified their military cooperation. Furthermore, a recentnuclear agreement with the United States means that India has de facto officially beenadmitted to the club of nuclear weapons states. The so-called nuclear deal means thatIndia now has access to the world’s nuclear market, a factor which is extremely importantfor the country’s energy supplies.The partnership with a thriving India is playing an increasingly important role in theUnited States’ “Grand Strategy”, particularly in the context of Washington’s competitionfor power with its challenger, China. Washington wants New Delhi to act as a counterbalanceto China in Southern Asia in order to contain Beijing’s influence in the region. Manyobservers conclude that India and the United States are not merely strategic partners, butmuch rather “natural friends”: two democracies with the same opponents (China, Islamistterrorism), the same values, transnational networks and concurring economic interests.However, it would be overhasty to presuppose perfect harmony between Washington andNew Delhi.Contrary to the hopes of policy-makers in Washington, India did not simply let itselfbecome integrated in the United States’ foreign and security policy.Auf den ersten Blick scheint nichts naheliegender zu sein als ein enges Bundnis zwischen den USA und Indien. Die machtigste und die bevolkerungsreichste Demokratie der Welt verbinden dieselben Gegner (China, islamistischer Terrorismus), gleiche Werte und ahnliche wirtschaftliche Interessen.So zogerte Indien nach den Anschlagen vom 11. September 2001 nicht, den USA seine volle Unterstutzung im Anti-Terror-Kampf zuzusagen. In der Folge intensivierten beide Lander ihre bilateralen Beziehungen auch auf anderen Gebieten. Perfekte Freundschaft?Harald Muller und Andreas Schmidt zeigen in ihrem Report die Grenzen dieser Freundschaft auf. Nach ihrer grundliche Analyse kommen sie zu dem Schluss, dass es betrachtliche Differenzen uber die Gestaltung der internationalen Ordnung gibt. Anders als fur die USA haben Volkerrecht und internationale Organisation fur Indien unbedingte Prioritat und gelten nicht als Behinderung, sondern als Stutze der eigenen Souveranitat. So distanzierte sich Indien nachdrucklich vom Irak-Krieg der USA und zeigte damit deutlich, dass es nicht bereit ist, sich vorbehaltlos an die USA zu binden.Mit dieser Wertschatzung von Volkerrecht und Vereinten Nationen liegt Indien deutlich naher an der Politik Berlins als an der jungeren Politik der USA und konnte damit in Zukunft auch fur Deutschland ein interessanter Verbundeter werden, wenn es darum geht, sich gelegentlich gegen den grosen Bruder in Washington durchzusetzen." @default.
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• W2200471182 date "2009-01-01" @default.
• W2200471182 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2200471182 title "Natural Friends? Relations between the United States and India after 2001" @default.
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