FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2203108322> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2203108322 abstract "The literature on the optimal enforcement of law considers a regulator determining both the sanction placed on a caught offender as well as a selection of a probability of apprehension. This approach originated by Becker (1968) leads to two results that do not match observation. First, since the marginal cost to the sanction is zero while there is a substantial cost to enforcement one should expect full compliance with a law using maximal sanctions and minimal enforcement. Second, both sanctions and the probability of apprehension increase with repeated violations. The inverse relationship between the two predicted from Becker's analysis contradicts this observation. Here I present both a rationale for the lack of full compliance as well as the relationship between increasing sanctions and increasing apprehension with repeat offenses. The literature on optimal enforcement considers only the population's response to the enforcement. By considering the enforcement official's response to the frequency of violations the strategic interactions of the players in a game is considered. In such a game the probability of apprehension arises from the mixed strategies in the game. I show that full compliance is not an equilibrium regardless of the magnitude of the sanction. If no individual violates the law then it would no longer be best for the enforcement official to expend the resources to induce full compliance. Furthermore, in a dynamic game the rate of apprehension is greater for a second offense than a first time conviction. If the population differs in its gain from breaking the law then those with a greater benefit to the violation are ex ante more likely to break it. As a result, the enforcement official must target them more so that in equilibrium they offend at the same rate as the others. As a consequence, disproportionately more of those caught breaking the law are those targeted in the enforcement. Therefore, a greater proportion of one-time violators will be caught with a second offense than those with no convictions are caught for a first offense. This result holds for any magnitude of the sanction and even holds for schedules that increase in severity with the number of prior convictions." @default.
• W2203108322 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2203108322 creator A5079824960 @default.
• W2203108322 date "2006-01-01" @default.
• W2203108322 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W2203108322 title "Compliance, Repeat Offenses, and Strategic Enforcement" @default.
• W2203108322 cites W1493418575 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W1513997056 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W1541184501 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W1863540115 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W1988149130 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W1994456313 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2016701684 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2026856666 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2028662480 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2029371828 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2034903793 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2038516625 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2053699364 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2067116323 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2080116610 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2151832513 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2189821821 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2346603846 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W2625387497 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W301903047 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W3020986452 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W3047991379 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W3121866937 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W3122638853 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W3122651481 @default.
• W2203108322 cites W3124532940 @default.
• W2203108322 doi "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.896933" @default.
• W2203108322 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
• W2203108322 type Work @default.
• W2203108322 sameAs 2203108322 @default.
• W2203108322 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2203108322 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2203108322 hasAuthorship W2203108322A5079824960 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C149923435 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C180747234 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2777278149 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2778069335 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2779777834 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2780262971 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2780409804 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2780982575 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2781460075 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C2908647359 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConcept C77805123 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C144024400 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C149923435 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C15744967 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C162324750 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C17744445 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C180747234 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C190253527 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C199539241 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2777278149 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2778069335 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2779777834 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2780262971 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2780409804 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2780982575 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2781460075 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C2908647359 @default.
• W2203108322 hasConceptScore W2203108322C77805123 @default.
• W2203108322 hasLocation W22031083221 @default.
• W2203108322 hasOpenAccess W2203108322 @default.
• W2203108322 hasPrimaryLocation W22031083221 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W1043607649 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W1909139244 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W1983022637 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W2042077556 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W2062647650 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W2577147524 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W3122973215 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W3153206115 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W570220410 @default.
• W2203108322 hasRelatedWork W2187926858 @default.
• W2203108322 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2203108322 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2203108322 magId "2203108322" @default.
• W2203108322 workType "article" @default.