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• W2203212323 abstract "A prominent finding in public good provision experiments is that contribution exceeds a noncooperative equilibrium. There are at least three possible motivations behind this overcontribution: decision errors, cooperation, and altruism. The aim of this study is to isolate and identify these motivations. The following paragraphs describe our main strategies for building our experimental model. First, in order to discriminate cooperation from altruism, we employ a nonlinear payoff function. If we had used linear payoff functions, as done in most previous studies, such discrimination would be impossible since both cooperative and altruistic motivations appear as full investments. Using a nonlinear payoff function creates one-to-one correspondence between investments and motivations and permits us to differentiate the two motivations. Second, in order to minimize possible decision errors, we prepare a payoff table that is comparable to the standard payoff table from previous studies. The latter is a payoff table in the nonstrategic form, or the whereas the former is a payoff table in the strategic form, or the The most important difference between the two payoff tables is the degree to which subjects can see the interdependence of strategies. In the case of the N table, it is obscure; however, in the S table, subjects can see it clearly because it is a matrix payoff table. Third, we examine how providing information regarding the other's payoff structure to each subject affects his/her decision. Under the complete information condition, each subject knows that the other has the same payoff table as his/her own. Under the incomplete information condition, both subjects are unaware of this fact. Since there are two payoff table conditions and two information conditions, we have four distinct treatments. We summarize the main results as follows. First, when the S table was used, the average individual contributions were not statistically different from the average Nash equilibrium level. On the other hand, when the N table was used, they were significantly greater than the average Nash equilibrium level. This result supports that the understanding of strategic interdependence is crucial for achieving the Nash equilibrium contribution. Second, although the frequencies of Nash motivation were approximately 90% under the S table condition, they were approximately 70% under the N table condition. When subjects knew the other's payoff information, some of them showed cooperative motivation represented by the symmetric Pareto efficient contribution. Altruistic motivation that corresponded to contributing everything was rare under both conditions. These results suggest that the cooperative and altruistic outcomes commonly observed over the past 20 years may be artifacts of the frame of the experimental environment." @default.
• W2203212323 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2203212323 date "2011-12-12" @default.
• W2203212323 modified "2023-09-29" @default.
• W2203212323 title "Isolating and identifying motivations: A voluntary contribution mechanism experiment with interior Nash equilibria" @default.
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• W2203212323 doi "https://doi.org/10.36334/modsim.2011.d1.kumakawa" @default.
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