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• W221267621 abstract "Bob Curtin: Wouldn't it be better, the way things are, to separate tomorrow, or even tonight?Fred C. Dobbs: That would suit you fine, wouldn't it?Curtin: Why me more than you?Dobbs: So you could fall on me from behind, sneak up, and shoot me in the back.Curtin: All right, I'll go first.Dobbs: And wait for me on the trail and ambush me?Curtin: Why wouldn't I do it right here and now if I meant to kill you?Dobbs: I'll tell you why. 'Cause you're yella. You haven't got nerve enough to pull the trigger while I'm lookin' you straight in the eye.Curtin: If you think like that, there's nothing to do but to tie you up every night.Dobbs: I'll tell you what. I'll make you a little bet . . . . I'll bet ya . . . you go to sleep before I do.1INTRODUCTIONIn the movie The Treasure of the Sierra Madre, three gold prospectors take a long, dangerous journey down a mountain after carefully dividing their gold into three equal shares. The older prospector is judicious and nonthreatening - and absent during the critical confrontation between the two younger prospectors. The two prospectors distrust one another and, in one scene, fight to stay awake for fear of being robbed by the other. What follows is a standoff in which both men fight the temptation to close their eyes so as not to give the other an opportunity to steal. The Madisonian system of government has often given rise to the same type of overt distrust among the three branches - particularly between the executive and legislative branches. Each branch has adopted novel means to jealously guard its own constitutional possessions in the tripartite division of power, while the judicial branch has largely stood to the side like the older prospector, leaving the other two branches to work things through the political process. The controversy over President Barack Obama's recent recess appointments demonstrates just how extreme and absurd the struggle has become over the appointment of federal officials. Each side appears to be engaged in a staring contest to deny the other any opportunity to rob it of its constitutional prerogatives. Congress refuses to recess for fear that the President will make unilateral appointments, while the President refuses to wait to allow Congress to act out of the belief that it will only abuse the time and opportunity. How recess appointments became an interbranch blinking contest is a cautionary tale for scholars who explore alternative approaches to the interpretation and limits of the separation of powers doctrine. These appointments offer an interesting context in which to explore the sufficiency of political checks and balances, as opposed to judicially enforced separation limitations, in conflicts between the executive and legislative branches. Generally speaking, modern interpretations of the Recess Appointments Clause2 have followed a pronounced functionalist approach to such conflicts, resulting in highly dysfunctional effects within the system as a whole as presidents openly circumvent opposition to nominees and create a class of unconfirmed high-ranking government officials. More importantly, functionalist approaches to recess appointments have allowed for the very thing that the Framers fought to avoid under a tripartite system of government: the aggregation or aggrandizement of power by one branch. There is good reason for Congress in particular to fear for its constitutional assets after decades of marginalization following the rise of federal agencies and the increasing power of the American presidency.Recess appointments continue to cause intense conflicts between the executive and legislative branches, as most recently illustrated by the intrasession nomination of Richard Cordray to serve as the first Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB).3 In these controversies, neither side appears particularly concerned that it is advancing a reductio ad absurdum interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause. …" @default.
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• W221267621 date "2013-10-01" @default.
• W221267621 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W221267621 title "Recess Appointments in the Age of Regulation" @default.
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