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• W2237792362 abstract "Journal of Derivatives AccountingVol. 01, No. 01, pp. 47-60 (2004) ArticlesNo AccessCEO COMPENSATION, INCENTIVES, AND GOVERNANCE IN NEW ENTERPRISE FIRMSLERONG HE and MARTIN J. CONYONLERONG HEThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2000 Steinberg Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA Search for more papers by this author and MARTIN J. CONYONThe Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2000 Steinberg Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USACorresponding author. Search for more papers by this author https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219868104000051Cited by:12 PreviousNext AboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsRecommend to Library ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmail AbstractThis study investigates executive compensation, corporate governance and the determination of CEO equity incentives in US entrepreneurial high technology firms. We find the following. First, CEO equity incentives in these new enterprise firms are twenty times larger than that which previous large firm studies have found. Second, both economic factors (firm size, growth opportunities, and risk) and governance factors (founder, venture capitalist presence, board structure, and ownership distribution) determine CEO incentives in these firms. We document instances where direct monitoring arrangements (e.g. venture capitalist monitoring) act as substitutes for explicit incentives in aligning shareholder and CEO interests.Keywords:Corporate governancepay for performanceequity incentives References R. K. Aggarwal and A. A. Samwick, Journal of Finance 58(1), 71 (2003). Crossref, Google Scholar Baker, G. and B. Hall (forthcoming). CEO incentives and firm size. Journal of Labor Economics . Google Scholar Baker, M. and P. A. Gompers (2000). An analysis of executive compensation, ownership and control in closely held firms. Working Paper, Harvard University . 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Crossref, Google Scholar FiguresReferencesRelatedDetailsCited By 12CEO excess compensation: the impact of compensation committee quality and corporate social responsibilityHui-Wen Hsu27 June 2022 | Applied Economics Letters, Vol. 9Empirical research on the function of compensation committees: the influence of family control and professional managersYen-Chi Chen and Hsuan-Lien Chu5 November 2019 | Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 27, No. 1The influence of firm and executive characteristics on performance-vested stock option grantsBo Qin1 Oct 2012 | International Business Review, Vol. 21, No. 5Compensation committee governance quality, chief executive officer stock option grants, and future firm performanceJerry Sun, Steven F. Cahan and David Emanuel1 Aug 2009 | Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 33, No. 8Compensation transparency and managerial opportunism: a study of supplemental retirement plansPaul Kalyta1 Apr 2009 | Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 30, No. 4Performance-vested stock options and interest alignmentYu Flora Kuang and Bo Qin1 Mar 2009 | The British Accounting Review, Vol. 41, No. 1Executive pensions, disclosure quality, and rent extractionPaul Kalyta and Michel Magnan1 Mar 2008 | Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Vol. 27, No. 2Corporate governance of German growth companies. Empirical analysis of the corporate governance quality and the structure of supervisory boards of companies listed on TEC-DAXAlexander Bassen, Maik Kleinschmidt and Christine Zöllner1 January 2006 | Corporate Ownership and Control, Vol. 3, No. 3Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all-equity firmsRaghavan (Raj) J. Iyengar, H. James Williams and Ernest M. Zampelli1 Dec 2005 | Accounting and Finance, Vol. 45, No. 4ACCOUNTING FOR EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS AND MANDATORY EXPENSING: AN ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVEJUNNING CAI7 April 2012 | Journal of Derivatives Accounting, Vol. 02, No. 02Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in US Entrepreneurial FirmsMartin J. Conyon and Lerong He1 Jan 2004 | SSRN Electronic Journal, Vol. 27Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial FirmsMartin J. Conyon and Lerong He1 Jan 2004 | Journal of Management Accounting Research, Vol. 16, No. 1 Recommended Vol. 01, No. 01 Metrics History KeywordsCorporate governancepay for performanceequity incentivesPDF download" @default.
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