Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2276972647> ?p ?o ?g. }
Showing items 1 to 63 of
63
with 100 items per page.
- W2276972647 endingPage "237" @default.
- W2276972647 startingPage "223" @default.
- W2276972647 abstract "The private entrepreneurs are not forced to limit themselves to the standard auction rules, and in case of the procurement auctions one can observe many hybrid or quasi-auction rules spontaneously introduced. The paper analyzes two of them, that are based on the common assumption: the second-best bidder is given an additional right to improve her initial bid, and therefore win the auction. The focus of the paper is on the analysis of price and allocative efficiency of such modifications, to determine whether they can serve as an alternative to the standard auction rules. Theoretical analyses, followed by the laboratory experiments, provide no proof for that conclusion though, as none of the rules under study beats the classical first-price sealed-bid auction." @default.
- W2276972647 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2276972647 creator A5017977873 @default.
- W2276972647 date "2014-11-20" @default.
- W2276972647 modified "2023-10-16" @default.
- W2276972647 title "(In)efficiency of auctions with the asymmetry of rights" @default.
- W2276972647 cites W1550761040 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W1986799195 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W1987768304 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2015007620 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2029050771 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2052075655 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2096423350 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2142985387 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2143532737 @default.
- W2276972647 cites W2149961401 @default.
- W2276972647 doi "https://doi.org/10.15208/beh.2014.19" @default.
- W2276972647 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
- W2276972647 type Work @default.
- W2276972647 sameAs 2276972647 @default.
- W2276972647 citedByCount "0" @default.
- W2276972647 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
- W2276972647 hasAuthorship W2276972647A5017977873 @default.
- W2276972647 hasBestOaLocation W22769726471 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C121332964 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C137577040 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C163239763 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C38976095 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConcept C62520636 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C121332964 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C137577040 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C144133560 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C162324750 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C163239763 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C175444787 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C38976095 @default.
- W2276972647 hasConceptScore W2276972647C62520636 @default.
- W2276972647 hasIssue "4" @default.
- W2276972647 hasLocation W22769726471 @default.
- W2276972647 hasLocation W22769726472 @default.
- W2276972647 hasLocation W22769726473 @default.
- W2276972647 hasOpenAccess W2276972647 @default.
- W2276972647 hasPrimaryLocation W22769726471 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W1551055757 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W1561739666 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W2034994451 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W2086968108 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W2100130887 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W2172088093 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W2216045354 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W3123532505 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W3125994954 @default.
- W2276972647 hasRelatedWork W4283789981 @default.
- W2276972647 hasVolume "10" @default.
- W2276972647 isParatext "false" @default.
- W2276972647 isRetracted "false" @default.
- W2276972647 magId "2276972647" @default.
- W2276972647 workType "article" @default.