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• W2277013453 abstract "This paper critically reviews the literature of family economics that includes models ranging from neoclassical to the feminist stand, and highlight important empirical findings. We conclude that family is a complex institution which contains both elements of bargaining and love. Whereas some people are enjoying the altruistic life in their families, others are suffering from family violence. Government needs to take intrahousehold resource allocation into consideration in formulating development policy. Exchange or Exploitation? A Review of the Literature of the Economics of Family 2 . . . the family affections generally are so pure a form of altruism, that their action might have shown little semblance of regularity, had it not been for the uniformity of the family relations themselves [Marshall 1920, 20]. If women are better than men at anything, it surely is in individual self-sacrifice for those of their own family. But I lay little stress on this, so long as they are universally taught that they are born and created for self-sacrifice [Mill 1970, 172]. There is a good deal of evidence from all over the world that food is often distributed very unequally within the family – with a distinct sex bias (against the female) and also an age bias (against the children). Such biases have been observed even in the richer countries, but the picture of discrimination is, of course, much sharper and more widespread in the poorer Third World economies [Sen 1984a, 347]. The analysis of rational behavior in the family was brought into economics in the 1960s by prominent economists, notably Gary Becker. In a highly simplified and extreme version of the neoclassical model, members of family are assumed to be supertraders, produced and exchanged the goods they needed in the households according to some implicit prices (Becker 1981a). In that model, family is considered as a single unit, and the household head makes the decision of the resource allocation. This well-known unitary household model methodologically parallels the firm model in neoclassical production analysis—both are just black boxes. This highly abstract assumption about household organization undoubtedly simplifies the analysis and makes more precise prediction possible. The remaining question is, however, do we miss something important in making this assumption? For one thing, there is ample evidence for sex bias against women in the family (Bardhan 1982; Sen and Sengupta 1983; Sen 1984a). This unpleasant fact bears vitally implications to the formulation of welfare policies; policy markers should take resource allocation within household into consideration. To use the 1 For an anthropological discussion, see Leacock and Safa (1986). For a sociological discussion, see Gupta (1974). Other important contribution includes Gronau (1977). Exchange or Exploitation? A Review of the Literature of the Economics of Family 3 words of Sen (1990), “entitlement within the family is equally important to the entitlement of the family”. In the followings we will first survey the theoretical literature of family economics. They include (i) the game theoretic Nash cooperative bargaining model (McElroy and Horney 1981; Manser and Brown 1980); (ii) the non-cooperative bargaining model (Lunderg and Pollak 1994); (iii) models that only rely on the Pareto efficiency property (Bourguignon and Chiappori 1992; Chiappori 1988); (iv) the feminist perspective (Folbre 1986; Macdonald 1995; Seiz 1991; Woolley 1993) (v) the transaction cost approach (Pollak 1995); and (vi) the entitlement approach (Sen 1990). After surveying the theoretical literature on the economics of family, we will present and discuss some empirical findings. The most important evidence to reject the unitary model mainly comes from the rejection of the income-pooling hypothesis (Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990). Second, family violence also rejects the assumption of altruism, which is important in Becker (1981a). On the other hand, we also present empirical work based on the assumption of unitary model, for instance Rosenzweig and Schultz (1982), to explain some seemingly gender biased actions in terms of efficiency. In the face of this voluminous literature, our survey is inevitably incomplete. Our modest objective is to show the diversity of views in this literature and highlights some empirical studies that have been done so far in this field. 2 Hoddinott et al. (1995) expresses the same feeling. They said that a comprehensive review of all empirical evidence on intrahousehold resource allocation in developing countries would be a book in itself. For a comprehensive survey, see Behrman (1992). Exchange or Exploitation? A Review of the Literature of the Economics of Family 4 Models of family economics" @default.
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• W2277013453 title "Exchange or exploitation? A review of the literature of the economics of family" @default.
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