FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2287882608> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2287882608 abstract "This thesis consists of four essays on the design and disclosure of compensation contracts. Essays 1, 2 and 3 focus on behavioral aspects of mandatory compensation disclosure rules and of contract negotiations in agency relationships. The three experimental studies develop psychology-based theory and present results that deviate from standard economic predictions. Furthermore, the results of Essay 1 and 2 also have implications for firms’ discretion in how to communicate their top management’s incentives to the capital market. Essay 4 analyzes the role of fairness perceptions for the evaluation of executive compensation. For this purpose, two surveys targeting representative eligible voters as well as investment professionals were conducted.Essay 1 investigates the role of the detailed ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’, which is part of the Security and Exchange Commission’s 2006 regulation, on investors’ evaluations of executive performance. Compensation disclosure complying with this regulation clarifies the relationship between realized reported compensation and the underlying performance measures and their target achievement levels. The experimental findings suggest that the salient presentation of executives’ incentives inherent in the ‘Compensation Discussion and Analysis’ makes investors’ performance evaluations less outcome dependent. Therefore, investors’ judgment and investment decisions might be less affected by noisy environmental factors that drive financial performance. The results also suggest that fairness perceptions of compensation contracts are essential for investors’ performance evaluations in that more transparent disclosure increases the perceived fairness of compensation and the performance evaluation of managers who are not responsible for a bad financial performance. These results have important practical implications as firms might choose to communicate their top management’s incentive compensation more transparently in order to benefit from less volatile expectations about their future performance.Similar to the first experiment, the experiment described in Essay 2 addresses the question of more transparent compensation disclosure. However, other than the first experiment, the second experiment does not analyze the effect of a more salient presentation of contract information but the informational effect of contract information itself. For this purpose, the experiment tests two conditions in which the assessment of the compensation contracts’ incentive compatibility, which determines executive effort, is either possible or not. On the one hand, the results suggest that the quality of investors’ expectations about executive effort is improved, but on the other hand investors might over-adjust their prior expectations about executive effort if being confronted with an unexpected financial performance and under-adjust if the financial performance confirms their prior expectations. Therefore, in the experiment, more transparent compensation disclosure does not lead to more correct overall judgments of executive effort and to even lower processing quality of outcome information. These results add to the literature on disclosure which predominantly advocates more transparency. The findings of the experiment however, identify decreased information processing quality as a relevant disclosure cost category. Firms might therefore carefully evaluate the additional costs and benefits of more transparent compensation disclosure. Together with the results from the experiment in Essay 1, the two experiments on compensation disclosure imply that firms should rather focus on their discretion how to present their compensation disclosure to benefit from investors’ improved fairness perceptions and their spill-over on performance evaluation. Essay 3 studies the behavioral effects of contextual factors in recruitment processes that do not affect the employer’s or the applicant’s bargaining power from a standard economic perspective. In particular, the experiment studies two common characteristics of recruitment processes: Pre-contractual competition among job applicants and job applicants’ non-binding effort announcements as they might be made during job interviews. Despite the standard economic irrelevance of these factors, the experiment develops theory regarding the behavioral effects on employees’ subsequent effort provision and the employers’ contract design choices. The experimental findings largely support the predictions. More specifically, the results suggest that firms can benefit from increased effort and, therefore, may generate higher profits. Further, firms may seize a larger share of the employment relationship’s profit by highlighting the competitive aspects of the recruitment process and by requiring applicants to make announcements about their future effort.Finally, Essay 4 studies the role of fairness perceptions for the public evaluation of executive compensation. Although economic criteria for the design of incentive compensation generally do not make restrictive recommendations with regard to the amount of compensation, fairness perceptions might be relevant from the perspective of firms and standard setters. This is because behavioral theory has identified fairness as an important determinant of individuals’ judgment and decisions. However, although fairness concerns about executive compensation are often stated in the popular media and even in the literature, evidence on the meaning of fairness in the context of executive compensation is scarce and ambiguous. In order to inform practitioners and standard setters whether fairness concerns are exclusive to non-professionals or relevant for investment professionals as well, the two surveys presented in Essay 4 aim to find commonalities in the opinions of representative eligible voters and investments professionals. The results suggest that fairness is an important criterion for both groups. Especially, exposure to risk in the form of the variable compensation share is an important criterion shared by both groups. The higher the assumed variable share, the higher is the compensation amount to be perceived as fair. However, to a large extent, opinions on executive compensation depend on personality characteristics, and to some extent, investment professionals’ perceptions deviate systematically from those of non-professionals. The findings imply that firms might benefit from emphasizing the riskiness of their managers’ variable pay components and, therefore, the findings are also in line with those of Essay 1." @default.
• W2287882608 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2287882608 creator A5056108510 @default.
• W2287882608 date "2014-01-01" @default.
• W2287882608 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2287882608 title "Essays on Behavioral Aspects of the Design and Disclosure of Compensation Contracts" @default.
• W2287882608 doi "https://doi.org/10.24442/boristheses.959" @default.
• W2287882608 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
• W2287882608 type Work @default.
• W2287882608 sameAs 2287882608 @default.
• W2287882608 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2287882608 crossrefType "dissertation" @default.
• W2287882608 hasAuthorship W2287882608A5056108510 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C108170787 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C151392489 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C162118730 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C175444787 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C199776023 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C200707436 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C2776034101 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C2777632292 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C2779055846 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C2780023022 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C29122968 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConcept C77805123 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C10138342 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C108170787 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C111472728 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C121955636 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C138885662 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C144133560 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C151392489 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C15744967 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C162118730 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C162324750 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C175444787 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C17744445 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C199539241 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C199776023 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C200707436 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C2776034101 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C2777632292 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C2779055846 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C2780023022 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C29122968 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C39389867 @default.
• W2287882608 hasConceptScore W2287882608C77805123 @default.
• W2287882608 hasLocation W22878826081 @default.
• W2287882608 hasOpenAccess W2287882608 @default.
• W2287882608 hasPrimaryLocation W22878826081 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W1537937187 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W1576665059 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W164669853 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W1811123978 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W1811352184 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2018066946 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2095532140 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2096615457 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2125822312 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2177213944 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2367210590 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2512414383 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2587322296 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2615144810 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2771424501 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2902222141 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W2912014331 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W3125323448 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W3187693780 @default.
• W2287882608 hasRelatedWork W343562024 @default.
• W2287882608 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2287882608 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2287882608 magId "2287882608" @default.
• W2287882608 workType "dissertation" @default.