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• W2316526053 abstract "An important problem for any government is to control the absolute and relative amounts of resources extracted from the economy by various components of society, especially the rate of business profits. If many or most economic actors are able to raise the absolute level of resources extracted in a dramatic way, rapid increases in inflation seem sure to follow unless production also increases. If only a few economic actors increase their capabilities in this area, then relative economic positions will change with the likelihood of political conflict increased. Both inflation and economically based political conflict are significant problems for all governments domestically and of interest to foreign governments since inflation can be exported and rapid relative economic changes in one or a few countries can disrupt patterns of world trade. How can governments prevent economically based instability? Economists have proposed a variety of macroeconomic tools. Some political scientists, however, have argued that current contending economic theories of macroeconomic outcomes and the policy tools that flow from these theories simply do not explain or fit well the economic reality of the past fifteen years.' At the same time over the past ten years an extensive literature on the different modes of organizing interests, sometimes called the corporatist literature, has developed.2 The rise of interest in corporatism and its apparently growing use in the western liberal democracies have led to the conclusion that corporatist instruments are far more effective in controlling inflation than market mechanisms or Keynesian techniques.' The relative presence or absence of corporatism is normally examined at the national level of political economies. The problem with this type of analysis linked to economic outcomes is that some other properties of individual nations may better explain these outcomes. One way of lessening this problem is to examine the organization of interests in different business sectors in the same country. If a country has some business sectors organized along pluralist lines and one or more along corporatist, and if these patterns of organization change over time, then we are better able to identify any relationship between interest intermediation and the attempts of government to control the extractive capacity of the business community. In order to answer this question this article will analyze nine business sectors in Canada over the period 1965-1980. First, we will examine the organization of these sectoral business interests in light of the classic definitions of pluralism and corporatism of Philippe C. Schmitter.4 Second, we will extend these definitions by classifying and defining the meaning of the activities of business interest associations and show how some activities are" @default.
• W2316526053 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2316526053 date "1986-07-01" @default.
• W2316526053 modified "2023-10-17" @default.
• W2316526053 title "Pluralist and Corporatist Intermediation, Activities of Business Interest Associations, and Corporate Profits: Some Evidence from Canada" @default.
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• W2316526053 doi "https://doi.org/10.2307/421692" @default.
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