FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2317293457> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2317293457 endingPage "518" @default.
• W2317293457 startingPage "511" @default.
• W2317293457 abstract "This splendid book makes several major contributions to the philosophy of mind. It is concerned principally with phenomenal consciousness, but it also has very useful things to say about a range of other topics, including representation, causation, causal exclusion, reduction, constitution, and the question of whether, and if so how, relational properties are grounded in intrinsic properties. It is innovative, deep, clear, judicious, and carefully argued, and it has many passages that illuminate classical texts and the contemporary literature. I will devote a section to each of its three main themes.In the first four chapters, Pereboom is principally concerned with a proposition he calls the qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis. According to this proposition, “our introspective representations fail to represent mental states as they are in themselves. More specifically, introspection represents phenomenal properties as having certain characteristic qualitative natures, and…these properties actually lack such features” (3). He does not assert that the qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis is true but rather maintains that it is an open epistemic possibility. As he shows, this is enough to put several key arguments for property dualism at risk, including the knowledge argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the Cartesian modal argument.As can be seen from the foregoing formulation, the hypothesis rests on the doctrine that awareness of phenomenal properties is always representational in character: when one is aware of a phenomenal property, one's state of awareness is partially constituted by a representation of the property. This doctrine implies that it is possible to draw a Kantian appearance/reality distinction with respect to awareness of phenomenal properties. On the one hand, there is the way that phenomenal properties are represented as being, and on the other, there is the way that phenomenal properties are in themselves. I will call the doctrine Kantian phenomenal representationalism (KP-representationalism, for short).It is clear that KP-representationalism runs counter to many of the assumptions that are embedded in folk psychology. Thus, for example, folk psychology appears to deny that it is possible to draw an appearance/reality distinction with respect to awareness of pain. Moreover, the view is opposed by two of the main theories of awareness of phenomenal properties. On one of these theories, awareness of phenomenal properties involves an unanalyzable cognitive relation that Russell and others have called acquaintance. This relation is thought to be constitutively independent of representations and to provide immediate and full access to the essential natures of the items on which it is focused. On the other theory, which is generally known as adverbialism, it is a mistake to regard awareness of phenomenal properties as involving a relation of any sort. Rather, when we say, for example, that someone is aware of a pain in his or her foot, what we mean, or at least should mean, is that the person is aware of his or her foot painfully. In general, phenomenal properties are not objects of awareness but rather modes of being aware. Because KP-representationalism runs counter to so much of folk psychology and because it is opposed by these two well-known accounts of phenomenal awareness, it requires an elaborate defense. As far as I can tell, however, Pereboom does not argue for it in the present book. Presumably, for the present, at least, he wishes to maintain only that it is an epistemic possibility.Pereboom's qualitative inaccuracy hypothesis can be seen as the conjunction of two doctrines. One is KP-representationalism and the other is a doctrine I will call the misrepresentation thesis. KP-representationalism allows for the possibility that our introspective representations are inaccurate. The misrepresentation thesis asserts that this possibility is in fact realized. Pereboom does not himself divide the qualitative inaccuracy thesis into these two components, but the distinction can be useful because the misrepresentation thesis can give rise to concerns that KP-representationalism does not occasion.According to the misrepresentation thesis, introspective awareness represents phenomenal properties as having qualitative natures that they in fact lack. But what are these qualitative natures supposed to be? Are they natural properties? If so, then how can they create the illusion that phenomenal properties are nonnatural? And if not, then how can a physical mind acquire the ability to represent them? Further, as I understand him, whether qualitative natures are natural or not, Pereboom is committed to saying that when we use an introspective representation to attribute a qualitative nature to a phenomenal property, the attribution is always erroneous. But naturalistic theories of representation normally imply that representation involves a relationship of covariance between representations and the items to which they refer. It's not at all clear that this condition could be satisfied if introspective attributions of qualitative natures were as systematically erroneous as Pereboom appears to maintain.It is possible that Pereboom is not obliged to rely as heavily on the misrepresentation thesis as he appears to do in practice. KP-representationalism provides a foundation for three quite different doctrines. One is the misrepresentation thesis itself. Another doctrine, which might be called the underspecification thesis, maintains that the representations in question underspecify the essential natures of phenomenal properties. Underspecification of this sort is a familiar feature of representation. For an example, consider a line drawing of a house. The drawing will inevitably leave out many of the details of the building's structure and provide no information at all about its material composition. Third, KP-representationalism provides a foundation for the belief-fostering thesis, according to which representations of phenomenal properties have a strong tendency to foster false beliefs about them, even though the representations themselves are not inaccurate. Thus, even though a representation refers to a complex property, it might be that the representation itself is syntactically simple and that it therefore functions within the larger cognitive system as a representational atom, affording no basis for higher cognitive faculties to appreciate the complexity of its referent. Reflection suggests that this doctrine and its immediate predecessor might be as useful in disarming arguments for dualism as the misrepresentation thesis.Although the misrepresentation thesis figures much more prominently in the book than the two alternatives, Pereboom appears to have the underspecification thesis in mind in one or two passages, and he explicitly considers the belief-fostering thesis. More specifically, it figures in his treatment of the impression that phenomenal properties are primitive, in the sense that they are “metaphysically simple and thus not constituted by, in the sense of metaphysically analyzable into, a plurality of other properties” (16). Pereboom considers two explanations of the impression of phenomenal primitiveness. One is that the relevant representations misrepresent properties that are actually quite complex as being metaphysically simple. But another is that the representations foster a false belief to the effect that the represented items are primitive, perhaps because they are themselves syntactically simple. Pereboom indicates that he actually favors this second explanation.Of course, it is one thing to explain why phenomenal states seem to us to be simple and quite another to explain why they seem to us to have qualitative natures that are altogether different from the natures of physical phenomena. As I understand him, Pereboom believes that it is necessary to rely on the misrepresentation thesis in giving an explanation of the latter sort. But it is not clear that this view is correct; it may be that the belief-fostering thesis will suffice. On one natural way of developing it, KP-representationalism implies that awareness of phenomenal states makes use of representations that are altogether different from the representations that figure in the awareness of physical states. Let us assume that this is the case. Is it any surprise that awareness that is supported by altogether different representations would give rise to an impression that the represented phenomena are different? If the introspective system uses altogether different representations than the systems we use to represent physical states, it seems that it would be only natural for this difference to reverberate through our higher cognitive systems, resulting finally in an impression that introspectible phenomena are separated from physical states by an unbridgeable gulf.1As a first pass, Russellian monism can be characterized as making the following three claims: first, physics tells us nothing about the intrinsic characteristics of physical entities but is concerned only to describe their actual and potential relational properties; second, physical entities must nevertheless have intrinsic characteristics because it holds as a general rule that relations must be grounded in intrinsic natures; and third, the intrinsic characteristics of fundamental physical entities are capable of playing “a significant role in explaining consciousness or experience” (89). Pereboom devotes two chapters to articulating these core doctrines and to examining their epistemological credentials. His goal is to provide physicalists with a second strategy for defending their position in case the strategy outlined in section 1 does not work out.Among other things, he considers various ideas about the nature of microphysical intrinsic characteristics. The two ideas that he takes most seriously are phenomenal micropsychism and protophenomenalism. Phenomenal micropsychism is a version of panpsychism—more specifically, it is the view that all fundamental physical entities, and therefore all physical entities, have intrinsic natures that are either the same as or very closely akin to the phenomenal properties that we encounter in experience. Protophenomenalism is the idea that the intrinsic properties of fundamental entities “are nonmental and similar enough to paradigmatic properties of current physics to count as physical, while at the same time they have a crucial role in grounding phenomenal properties of conscious states” (122).After considerable discussion of these alternatives, Pereboom concludes that phenomenal micropsychism would require us to posit irreducible laws linking microphysical intrinsic properties to physical relations. These additional fundamental laws would add significantly to the complexity of Russellian monism, without providing any additional unity, and would therefore “fail to yield a deeply illuminating explanation of the [relational] properties specified by current microphysics” (115). On the other hand, there is some reason to hope that protophenomenalism can do better. To be sure, as Pereboom acknowledges, it is by no means clear at this point that it is possible for us to form adequate concepts of protophenomenal properties. Some philosophers, such as Colin McGinn, have argued that this is in fact the case: according to McGinn, we constitutionally lack the conceptual wherewithal to resolve the mind-body problem. But Pereboom joins Thomas Nagel and David Chalmers in being cautiously optimistic about the prospects of a satisfactory version of protophenomenalism. (As Pereboom emphasizes at length, Chalmers is largely responsible for bringing the protophenomenalist version of Russellian monism to the attention of contemporary philosophers. The term “protophenomenal properties” was devised by Chalmers.)The case for Russellian monism requires us to agree that physics is not concerned with intrinsic properties, and this means that it requires us to accept that properties like has a negative charge are constituted by actual and potential relations. It is not clear to me that this is so. It is of course true that has a negative charge is intimately linked to relational properties, but I would have liked to see some concrete arguments that the relationship is constitutive rather than simply nomological. Moreover, the case for Russellian monism stands or falls with what Pereboom calls the Intrinsicness Principle:Any mind-independently real substantial entity must have at least one substantival absolutely intrinsic property (101).As Pereboom explains in detail, this principle has enjoyed considerable popularity in the history of philosophy, probably because there are widely shared intuitions to the effect that actual and potential relations must be grounded in intrinsic properties. It isn't clear that we should trust such intuitions, however, for it seems that there are clear counterexamples to a generalized grounding thesis. Thus, as Kant pointed out, things that are alike in their intrinsic properties can differ in point of their spatial relations. For example, drops of water that are duplicates of each other can be located at different positions in space and can stand at different distances from a third thing. Since the drops of water are intrinsic duplicates, it seems that neither of these spatial facts about the drops has anything to do with their intrinsic properties (Kant 1998, 368).So far we have been reviewing general worries about the motivation for Russellian monism, but there is also a more particular concern about protophenomenalism. It seems to pose a dilemma. Either protophenomenal properties are sufficiently similar to familiar phenomenal properties that it is easy to see how they could constitute phenomenal properties, or they are not. On the one hand, if they are sufficiently similar, then it will be hard to see how they could provide a more-than-nomological ground for physical relations. Would it be at all explanatory to say, for example, that an intrinsic property that is similar to the phenomenal property being a case of phenomenal yellow provides a ground for the relational property having a negative charge? And on the other hand, if protophenomenal properties are quite different than phenomenal properties, then, it seems, a philosopher who claims that phenomenal properties are constituted by protophenomenal properties is not in a much better epistemological or metaphysical position than a philosopher who claims that they are constituted by physical properties.Pereboom devotes the last two chapters of the book to articulating and defending a novel version of nonreductive physicalism. On this view, mental state types are not identical with neural or functional state types but rather with abstract structural state types that can be exemplified both by concrete neural state tokens and by isomorphic state tokens in artificial brains. More specifically, mental state types are identical with compositional state types—abstract characteristics that “something has solely by virtue of intrinsic features of its parts and relations that those parts have to one another” (126–27). These compositional state types figure in causal laws and can therefore be said to bestow causal powers on their instances, but they differ from functional properties in that their association with causal powers is contingent. Pereboom's theory also has an account of how tokens of mental states are related to tokens of neural states. The relation is constitution: tokens of mental states are constituted by tokens of neural states, which are in turn constituted by tokens of microphysical states. Thus, “in this position the physicality of mental state types is twice grounded, first by way of constitution of each token of the type in the microphysical, and second by way of identity to sufficiently abstract compositional properties” (127).The resulting position is quite attractive, and Pereboom throws light on a number of related issues in developing it. I expect, however, that readers will have reservations about it.In the first place, it is natural to have doubts about the motivation for nonreductive physicalism. For Pereboom as for others, the rationale for the view consists principally of the multiple realization argument. I suspect that many readers will have ceased to feel that this argument is rationally compelling.To be sure, Pereboom does not endorse all versions of the argument; he keeps his distance from versions that are meant to show that members of other animal species have mental states like ours, despite having brains that are structurally quite different. I applaud this skepticism; those versions of the argument are in my view extremely weak. (For one thing, the intuitive attributions of mental states to which they appeal can be explained away as the products of a quick and very dirty System One heuristic that is activated principally by biological motion. These intuitions are withdrawn when a reflective, System Two process is given information about the usually rather substantial divergences between the human brain and the brains of the relevant animals.2) As against Pereboom, however, I think there are also grounds for questioning versions of the multiple realization argument that are concerned with androids whose brains are composed of silicon but are nonetheless structurally isomorphic with ours. It is an immediate consequence of Block's thought experiment involving the Chinese nation that our attributive practices do not recognize structural isomorphism as a sufficient ground for attributing phenomenal properties. (In Block 1978, the Chinese nation is organized in a way that reflects the abstract neural structure of the human brain as well as its functional properties. Most people who consider this example are unwilling to say that the Chinese nation enjoys phenomenal consciousness.) Pereboom might reply by urging that we have an inclination to attribute phenomenal states to embodied androids like C3PO, at least when we have reason to think that their brains are structurally similar to ours. There is some merit in this claim, but I think that the inclination has more to do with C3PO's capacity for speech and biological motion than the imagined isomorphism; for if it derived primarily from the isomorphism, we would be willing to attribute conscious mental states to billions of Chinese people in a stadium, given that the interactions of the individual people are akin to the interactions of human neurons.In general, I would have a lot more confidence in Pereboom's metaphysical system-building if it were grounded in some x-phi data concerning intuitions about androids under various scenarios. For example, are people less inclined to attribute conscious experiences to C3PO after they have considered Block's example? What happens to their intuitions when C3PO's powers of speech and biological motion are reduced because his brain is housed in a different sort of body? What happens to them in contexts in which the differences between silicon chips and human neurons have been accentuated? My guess is that when answers to these questions are in hand, they will not be such as to mandate nonreductive versions of physicalism, though they may leave it as an option.A second concern is that all versions of the central state identity thesis, including ones that affirm the identity of mental state types with abstract structural properties of neural events, are challenged by transparency considerations. Qualia seem to be out there in the body, or to be properties of external objects, albeit properties that can be experienced only by viewers with perceptual systems of a certain sort. The pain is in my foot, and the way that banana looks right now is a relational property of the banana. All versions of the central state identity thesis, including Pereboom's theory, must reject these fundamental intuitions. In saying this, I don't mean to deny that central state identity theories have a lot going for them. On the contrary, I feel that they receive strong support from the fact that there are very tight correlations linking conscious experiences with brain states. My view is that all theories of qualia are faced with a paradox, in which intuitions of transparency are pitted against correlational data. Before I could embrace Pereboom's theory, I would have to see something that he has not yet provided—a resolution of the paradox that explains away transparency intuitions and sustains the view that correlations are best explained by identity.3Although Pereboom's book leaves us with many questions, it is an outstanding work that philosophers of mind of all stripes will find richly rewarding. I have ordered it for my fall seminar and will no doubt use it again in future courses.I am grateful to Katherine Dunlop and James Van Cleve for help with the preparation of this review." @default.
• W2317293457 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2317293457 creator A5018934820 @default.
• W2317293457 date "2013-01-01" @default.
• W2317293457 modified "2023-09-25" @default.
• W2317293457 title "Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism" @default.
• W2317293457 cites W2752099845 @default.
• W2317293457 doi "https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2087867" @default.
• W2317293457 hasPublicationYear "2013" @default.
• W2317293457 type Work @default.
• W2317293457 sameAs 2317293457 @default.
• W2317293457 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2317293457 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2317293457 hasAuthorship W2317293457A5018934820 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConcept C113220239 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConcept C182744844 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConcept C186720457 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConcept C522434184 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConceptScore W2317293457C111472728 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConceptScore W2317293457C113220239 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConceptScore W2317293457C138885662 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConceptScore W2317293457C182744844 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConceptScore W2317293457C186720457 @default.
• W2317293457 hasConceptScore W2317293457C522434184 @default.
• W2317293457 hasIssue "3" @default.
• W2317293457 hasLocation W23172934571 @default.
• W2317293457 hasOpenAccess W2317293457 @default.
• W2317293457 hasPrimaryLocation W23172934571 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2003245391 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2084702955 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2156318473 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2232835854 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2784675359 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2940835018 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W3168672607 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W4284962303 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W648535152 @default.
• W2317293457 hasRelatedWork W2463514841 @default.
• W2317293457 hasVolume "122" @default.
• W2317293457 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2317293457 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2317293457 magId "2317293457" @default.
• W2317293457 workType "article" @default.