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• W2336205688 abstract "We assess empirically the effects of the winner’s curse which, in common-value auctions, counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases. First, we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders’ preferences have both common- and private-values components, and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model. Second, we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the State of New Jersey. For a large subset of these auctions, we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies. In this setting, then, asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable. Query 1 How do increases in competition affect equilibrium bidding at auctions? According to the Walrasian analogy of markets as auctions, an increase in the number of bidders should encourage more aggressive bidding so that, in the limit, as the number of bidders becomes arbitrarily large, the imperfectly competitive auction setting approaches the efficient perfectly competitive outcome. While this is true within the independent private-values paradigm, it may not be true at auctions with affiliated signals, an important subset of which are common-value (hereafter CV) auctions in which the competing bidders are differentially (but incompletely) informed about the value of the object which they are trying to win. A distinctive feature of common-value auctions is the winner’s curse, an adverse-selection problem which arises because the winner tends to be the bidder with the most overly optimistic information (or “signal”) concerning the object’s value. Bidding naively based simply on ones information would lead to negative expected profits so that, in equilibrium, a rational bidder internalizes the winner’s curse by bidding less aggressively. 1 In common-value settings, however, an increase in the number of bidders has two counteracting effects on equilibrium bidding behaviour. First, the increased competition generally leads to more aggressive bidding, as each potential bidder tries to maintain her chances of winning against more rivals: we call this the competitive effect. Second, the winner’s curse" @default.
• W2336205688 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2336205688 creator A5079975437 @default.
• W2336205688 date "2002-01-01" @default.
• W2336205688 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2336205688 title "Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from" @default.
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