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• W2370516091 abstract "In Chinese capital market,independent directors always seen as non-independent,know little and a typical vase.In academic world role of independent directors is also under debate.Though some authors find a positive relation,most evidences cannot support effective governance role view.Nguyen and Nielsen(2010) asks question are all independent directors same,or there remains other factors which determine value of different independent directors? which is considered as the puzzle of role of independent directors.In our opinion,the mixed evidence of extant literature on efficiency of independent directors is mainly due to ineffective measures of characteristic of independent directors.As world's corporate governance reform and various regulations being severing,the extant measurement such as independent directors' proportion of a firm is no long a good method to distinguish governance role of independent directors.We believe that key point of this problem is because previous literature mainly focuses on directors' Attribute Feature and assumes that directors make their decisions solely.However,as a part of economic society,directors among different network relations,and this network can influence their governance role(Larcker et al.,2011);Secondly,most previous studies use proportion of independent directors as proxy variable.But according to our statistics,the p25meanmedianp75 of proportion is around 33%,which justly conforms regulation policy.So it's not a surprise that evidences is mixed. Because board network can represent directors' governance incentive and capacity(Xie and Chen,2012),independent directors with more network centrality have more encourage to monitor management and large shareholders,and effectively reduce agency problem.So different from previous studies,this paper defines board network as directors' connections based on sitting at least in one same board,and figure out its boundary from thenodeandrelation perspectives.Based on definition,and based on network analysis method,this paper investigates how network attributes of directors affect role of independent directors on reducing firm's agency cost.In order to construct a firm-level network measure,we compute median and mean value of firm's independent directors' network centrality(degree,between,close and eigenvector) as firm's network centrality.Similar as Ang et al.(2000) and Luo and Zhu(2010),we use management cost to represent Type I agency cost,and use cash occupation as Type II agency cost(Jiang et al.,2010).Like Li(2007),we use turnover ratio to measure agency efficiency of firm.Empirical evidence shows that higher network centrality of independent directors,the less of both executives-shareholders' Type I agency cost and large shareholders-minority shareholders' Type II agency cost.However,firm's ownership can partly play a decreasing effect of board network's governance role. As a result,we believe independent directors not really a vase,and different networks of director have different effects.This evidence supports recent literature such as Coles et al.(2008) and Chen et al.(2010) who call for more attention in one-size-fit-all regulation policy.Also,our results benefits Chinese capital market,independent directors with more board network centrality can effectively reduce agency problem and increase agency efficiency,this implication can help different participants in capital market correctly make sure role of independent directors.For example,the SASAC regulation policy require state-owned companies to appoint professional independent directors,while in reality many of them haven't got enough experience to monitoring management and controlling shareholder,so our results can benefit this dilemma. In future work,we can get opinion of independent directors to board proposal and individual voting data to further test whether directors with network background really act more independently and objectively compared with those without;also,we can investigate which kind of firms would prefer network-based independent directors,which can verify this paper's guess." @default.
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• W2370516091 date "2012-01-01" @default.
• W2370516091 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2370516091 title "The Network Attributes of Independent Directors and Firm's Agency Costs" @default.
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