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• W23731172 abstract "Agency Costs of Controlling Minority Shareholders (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) estimates the agency costs of controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) using a panel of Swedish listed firms. CMSs are owners who have a control stake of the firm’s votes while owning only a minority fraction of the firm’s equity. The study documents that families in control are almost exclusively CMSs through an extensive use of dual-class shares. The results show that increased ownership of votes by a controlling owner is associated with an economically and statistically significant decrease in firm value, but that the decrease in firm value is significantly larger for firms with family CMSs than for firms with financial institutions or corporations in control. This indicates that the agency costs of family CMSs are larger than the agency costs of other controlling owners.Family Ownership, Control Considerations, and Corporate Financing Decisions: An Empirical Analysis analyzes the relation between concentrated family control and firms’ choice of capital structure for a panel of Swedish listed firms. The results suggest that the capital structure choices made by firms with families in control are influenced by the controlling families’ desire to protect their control, and that the resulting capital structures are likely to increase the agency costs of family control. The Choice between Rights Offerings and Private Equity Placements (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist) analyzes the determinants of the choice between rights offerings and private equity placements using a sample of rights offerings and private placements made by listed Swedish firms. The results indicate that control considerations explain why firms make uninsured rights offerings. The evidence also suggest that private placements, and to some extent underwritten rights offerings, are made by potentially undervalued firms in order to overcome underinvestment problems resulting from asymmetric information about firm value. Furthermore, private placements are frequently made in conjunction with the establishment of a product market relationship between purchaser and seller, which is consistent with equity ownership reducing contracting costs in new product market relationships. Why Agency Costs Explain Diversification Discounts (coauthored with Henrik Cronqvist and Peter Hogfeldt) studies diversification within the real estate industry, in which firms can diversify over property types and geographical regions. Similar to previous studies, this essay documents the existence of a diversification discount. However, the major cause of the diversification discount is not diversification per se but anticipated costs due to rent dissipation in future diversifying acquisitions. Firms expected to pursue non-focusing strategies do indeed diversify more, are valued ex ante at a 20% discount over firms anticipated to follow a focusing strategy, and are predominantly family controlled. The ex ante diversification discount is, therefore, a measure of agency costs. The Difference in Acquirer Returns between Takeovers of Public Targets and Takeovers of Private Targets shows, for a sample of Swedish takeovers, that the average acquirer abnormal return is positive and significant when the target firm is privately held but insignificant when the target firm is listed on a stock exchange. These results are robust when controlling for sample selection problems and other variables capable of explaining acquirer returns. The evidence is consistent with greater acquirer bargaining power and resolution of information asymmetries in takeovers of private targets." @default.
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• W23731172 date "2012-01-01" @default.
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• W23731172 title "The difference in acquirer returns between takeovers of public targets and takeovers of private targets" @default.
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