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• W2374920596 abstract "Intensified investment-market competition is encouraging investors to receive delayed higher returns via real options.The option game theory is gradually gaining attention from academic researchers.Technology and market uncertainties are inherent in all patent RD investments.Most current RD investment research models assume that the success time of any patent RD investment project follows the equal-strength homogeneous Poisson process or memorylesspatent race.However,success of RD research projects relies on accumulated experiences and knowledge.Therefore,most successful RD projects are memorable.This paper tries to assess the patent value according to the geometric Brownian motion.We assume that once firms begin investing in RD projects,the project success time is subject to the non-homogeneous Poisson process.Different from a normal model's constant patterns,the Poisson process risk rate is a bounded function of the time duration of a RD investment.We first analyzed a single firm's optimal investment time,and then adopted the option game method to analyze the non-cooperative game of the memorable patent race between symmetric duopoly firms.The optimal investment decisions made by a single firm under no competition pressure depend on the optimal random stopping time.In a continuum,the real option value can be obtained by solving relevant Bellman equation.A firm's investment NPV can be solved in the stopping region.Value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions can be adopted to calculate coefficients of option and investment threshold values.After comparing the option value with the investment threshold value obtained under memory-less conditions,we discovered that with the existingLearning Effectfor a single firm and under the memorable RD,the investment critical value is lowered,and the value is increased compared with the memory-less case.Non-cooperative game analysis is the focus of this paper.We first discussed the follower's investment decisions according to the backward reasoning principle of dynamic game analysis.We then analyzed the leader's value and discussed the issue of optimal simultaneous investment and market equilibrium analysis.After comparing values of leaders and followers in the stopping region,we discovered that a leader's value is constantly larger than a follower's value.The finding is totally different from that in the memory-less patent race.Under the complete information game condition,the two players can understand not only the consequence of being the leader or follower,but also their own values at the optimal investment time.After comparing the values of leaders and followers at the optimal simultaneous investment time,we ruled out the possibility that the optimal simultaneous investment value is constantly larger than the leader's value.The game does not result in any optimal simultaneous investment equilibrium.Once the patent's value reaches or surpasses the critical value needed to become the leader,the leaders and the followers will have the motivation of becoming the leader and initiate the investment project immediately.This incentive can eventually lead to simultaneous investment equilibrium with a relatively low patent value that is not acceptable to both players in the race.We concluded this research by presenting theIndividual Rationality Leads to Collective Irrationalityconcept." @default.
• W2374920596 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2374920596 creator A5080791772 @default.
• W2374920596 date "2011-01-01" @default.
• W2374920596 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2374920596 title "Option Games in Memorable Patent Race" @default.
• W2374920596 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
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