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• W237803306 abstract "Rebecca J. Johnson is a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University. She wishes to thank Andrew Bennett and Angela Stent for their comments on an earlier draft of this article.Many have criticized the actions of Russian leaders in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts as chaotic. 1 In fact, Russian responses to those two wars have reflected Russia's unchanging views on the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the use of force versus diplomacy and on the appropriate relationship between the NATO allies and Russia. Russia argued consistently that force was legal in the conflicts only within the terms dictated by the Security Council--as a tool to protect peacekeepers and enforce safe havens and weapons exclusion zones. Force was legitimate only if strike targets were chosen without bias and in consultation with Russian officials. Force was effective only as a tool to reduce open conflict and facilitate diplomatic mediation. According to Russian officials, only diplomacy is capable of resolving entrenched ethnopolitical disputes; force as a tool of conflict resolution is doomed to failure.In this article I seek to correct the misperception that officials from Moscow tried merely to obstruct the multilateral responses to the two crises. Clearly Russia tried to confine decision making about the multilateral response to venues where it had procedural power, such as the UN Security Council or the Contact Group. But those efforts did not--as is popularly argued--translate into Russia's denouncing multilateral efforts to resolve the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. 2 To the contrary, although the parliament and the public opposed the use of air power, some members of Russia's executive branch worked consistently with Western powers behind the scenes to reach diplomatic solutions in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moscow's public condemnations of NATO's actions, while likely sincere, did not translate into a complete renunciation of cooperation with the allies.This last point is critical, because rising separatist sentiment in both Montenegro and Kosovo, coupled with the tenuous hold that newly elected Yugoslav president Vojislav Kostunica has over the Serbian state and population, could lead in the coming months to new conflicts in the region that would call on Russia, the United States, and Europe for yet another round of crisis management in the Balkans. 3 An understanding of Russia's position is critical to ensuring a multilateral effort that responds effectively to the situation in the Balkans while maintaining positive relations among the involved states. If we can discern a consistent pattern in Russia's approach to third-party use of force to resolve entrenched conflicts it may be possible to anticipate Russia's reaction to renewed multilateral action in the region.Russia may have proved unwilling to heed its own advice with regard to conflict resolution in its current campaign in Chechnya, but it offered some valid criticism of NATO's responses to the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. In the final section of this article I will flesh out a proposal for the Balkans that draws from Russia's assumptions about legal, legitimate, and effective means to address entrenched crises. The proposal constructs a multilateral arrangement that gives Russia a more central voice in the process by focusing on crisis prevention rather than crisis management or resolution, placing more emphasis on diplomacy than force. 4NATO's Use of Air Power in Bosnia and KosovoNATO's use of force has evolved over the course of the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The UN Security Council initially authorized the use of force in March 1993 to enforce UN-mandated safe zones and arms exclusion zones. 5 Russian officials lent their public support, endorsing early strikes on Serb forces that violated UN provisions. Rules of engagement stipulated that NATO forces were to give warnings of imminent attacks prior to the initiation of air strikes, and NATO commanders were ordered to select targets that would minimize civilian and military casualties. …" @default.
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• W237803306 date "2001-03-22" @default.
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• W237803306 title "Russian Responses to Crisis Management in the Balkans: How NATO's Past Actions May Shape Russia's Future Involvement" @default.
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