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• W2384451396 abstract "The literature shows that the political connection will reduce the investment efficiency for the domestic listed firms.However,the influence of the political connetion to the investment efficiency will change with the institutional background.On one hand,in the relaxed regulation and strong governemt intervention market,the enterprises are easily influenced by the government and do more ineffective investment.On the other hand,It has also proved that in a well regulated market,such as United States,the political connection has no effect to the enterprises value.In this paper,we comprises this two opposite opinion and proves that the reason why there would be two conclusions,is to ignore the institutional background of the firm,the strict regulatory and legal environment of the region are important factors which can influence the political connection. Overseas listed can be treated as a mandatory change to the legal environment When firms list in overseas market,they will face stronger relugation environment and more transparent information disclore requirement.The bonding theory has documented the law environment and capital market condition will improve a lot,which will lead to weak the political factors.So the manager will make decision based on the value of the enterprises instead their private benefit(Lel and Miller,2009;Fresard and Salva,2010).We test this hypothesis by comparing the investment efficiency of the Chinese firms listing domestic and listing overseas. Taking the Chinese overseas listed firms from 2000 to 2008 as sample,we study the effect of political connection on the efficiency of investment and the law and regulation effect for their relationship.Taking the sensitivity of investment expenditure to Tobin-Q as the variable for investment efficiency,excluding the investment efficiency differences of both domestic listed enterprises and overseas listed ones before listing,we empirically estimates the effect of political connection on companies' investment efficiency after listing by the Difference in Difference method. The empirical shows that the political connection weak the investment efficiency for the overseas listed firms as whole,the investment efficiency of the policial connected firms is lower than the non-political connected.but it has different effect for the differenct exchanges.In particular it has no effect for the firms listed in Hong Kong,Singapore and United Nation,and it has negative effect for the firms listed in the United States. This study contributes to the literature in two ways.First,our findings of differential effects of political connections on investment efficiency in different exchanges enhance our understanding of firm political connections in general.We conclude that the regulation and the information disclosure are important reason for the political effect.In the well regulated market,the effect of political connections on investment efficiency is weak.Second,we support the existing of bonding hypothesis in Chinese overseas-listing firms.Through the comparison between the Overseas and the Domestic listing companies,the overseas listing is indeed able to regulate the companies effectively,enhances the protection of the investor,reduces the large shareholder expropriation behavior,and controls the management rights.Strengthening corporate governance internally,and reinforcing market supervision externally,it leads to reduction of agency problems and asymmetric information problems ultimately.Finally,we support the agency problem and the asymmetric information will lead the under(or over) investment.The improvement of the information asymmetric will enforce the investment efficiency. Our results imply that future cross-listing research should be mindful of whether the cross-listing firm is from what exchanges and through what way go public.Along these lines,the Chinese firms who choose Hongkong,Singapore and London exchanges as their listing place can well regulate themselves and weaken the nagtive effect from the political connection.However,firms who choose Nasdaq as listing place can't reach this effects." @default.
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• W2384451396 date "2012-01-01" @default.
• W2384451396 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2384451396 title "Political Connection and Investment Efficiency for Chinese Overseas Firms" @default.
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