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- W2387794816 abstract "This paper incorporates loss aversion into the newsvendor framework by assuming that there are psychological costs of leftovers and stock-outs based on the asymmetry theory of losses and gains with respect to a reference point.Accordingly,this paper analyzes the impact of loss aversion on contract design in the supply chain system by constructing a subjective utility function of the loss-averse member and postulating the loss aversion character as private information.The outline of this paper is as follows.In section 1,we review the existing literatures about how loss aversion affects supply chain members' behaviors and how to design a supply contract under asymmetric information.In section 2,we establish a supply chain system composed of a rational supplier and a retailer with a probability of owning loss aversion character.The supplier's task is to develop optimal contracts( i.e.,pooling contract or screening contract) to maximize its expected profit given the probability of the retailer's owning loss aversion character.In sections 3 and 4,we propose the design processes of the pooling contract and screening contract respectively:Under the pooling contract,the supplier decides the unified wholesale price for two different types of retailers( i.e.,loss-averse retailer and loss-neutral retailer).The retailer determines the order quantity according to its type.Under the screening contract,the supplier designs a contract menu containing both wholesale prices and order quantities in order to disclose the retailer's true type.In section 5,we establish some linear relationships between unit psychological costs and the product's sale price.We further compare the expected profits( utilities) of the supplier and the retailer under the two contracts through a numerical simulation.Finally,we give concluding remarks in section 6.We obtain the optimal wholesale price for the supplier and optimal order quantity for different retailers under the pooling contract.We find find that the supplier ‘s optimal wholesale price has a positive correlation with the probability of retailer ‘s owning loss aversion character and retailer' s unit psychological cost of stock-outs.However,the supplier ‘s optimal wholesale price has a negative correlation with retailer's unit psychological cost of leftovers.In addition,we find that the optimal order quantities of the two types of retailers have a negative correlation with the probability of retailer 's owning loss aversion character,but have different correlations with retailer 's unit psychological costs.The loss-neutral retailer 's optimal order quantity has a positive( negative)correlation with the unit psychological cost of leftovers( stock-outs) while the loss-averse retailer's optimal order quantity has a positive correlation with the unit psychological cost of stock-outs and a uncertain correlation with the unit psychological cost of leftovers( depending on the relationship of the unit production cost and other parameters).Under the model of screening contract,we find that effective screening contract can be designed only under the condition that the unit production cost is relatively low and supplier can choose the optimal contract by comparing his optimal expected profits under the two contracts.Otherwise,the pooling contract is optimal.Our simulation,in which the unit production cost is relatively low,demonstrates that the supplier can achieve a higher expected utility under the screening contract as long as the effective screening contract can be designed." @default.
- W2387794816 created "2016-06-24" @default.
- W2387794816 creator A5077894195 @default.
- W2387794816 date "2014-01-01" @default.
- W2387794816 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
- W2387794816 title "Contracting with a Loss-Averse Retailer in a Supply Chain" @default.
- W2387794816 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
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