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• W2396197218 abstract "In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin hardly veiled his desire to lead Russia back to superpower status. Putin's rhetoric emphasizes a multipolar world where United States is no longer dominant power, and his actions present Russian global leadership as a viable alternative to United States'. Increasingly visible is multifaceted nature of Russia's tactics for undermining U.S. power projection in multiple theaters, including Latin America. Leaders of U.S. defense and intelligence communities have responded to Russia's growing global assertiveness by repeatedly singling out Russia as primary military and strategic to United States, particularly following Russia's recent annexation of Crimea and hostile activities in Ukraine.In March 2015, Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper labeled Russia a threat actor and an example of a nation where the nexus among organized crime, state actors, and business blurs distinction between state policy and private gain.1 The 2015 National Military Strategy presented by Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that Russia has repeatedly demonstrated that does not respect sovereignty of its neighbors and is willing to use force to achieve its goals. Russia's military actions are undermining regional security directly and through proxy forces.2The accuracy of these assessments of Russian intentions and capabilities can be documented throughout many parts of world. Yet this lens is seldom used in analyzing burgeoning Russian diplomatic and military in Latin America - particularly in Central America. The formal Russian state is accompanied by state business ventures, soft power overtures, increasing Russian organized criminal activity, and reactivation of Cold War proxy networks. While seldom part of strategic analysis of new Russian state, there is clear evidence that Latin America, considered an area of vital interest to United States, is now an area of intense Russian state interest and activity.As General John Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) noted in recent Congressional testimony, it been over three decades since we last saw this type of high-profile Russian presence in Latin America.3 In his command's 2015 Posture Statement Kelly added that:Periodically since 2008, Russia pursued an increased in Latin America through propaganda, military arms and equipment sales, counterdrug agreements, and trade. Under President Putin, however, we have seen a clear return to Cold War tactics. As part of its global strategy, Russia is using power projection in an attempt to erode U.S. leadership and challenge U.S. influence in Western Hemisphere. . .While these actions do not pose an immediate threat, Russia's activities in hemisphere are concerning and underscore importance of remaining engaged with our partners.4This is not to say that Russia in Latin America presents an imminent military to United States. But Russian officials have been brazen about their desire to undermine and confront United States in Western Hemisphere, its main sphere of influence, to counter what Russia perceives as U.S. interference in Russia's border territories. In current Latin American context Russia made greater progress toward their goals than is usually acknowledged.While U.S. position remains preeminent - due to geographic proximity, cultural ties, and trade ties - is eroding more quickly than is often understood. Also eroding, as Russia and other extra-regional actors such as China and Iran strengthen hands of a bloc of radical populist governments, is longstanding U.S. goal of establishing functioning democracies under rule of law with stable economic growth. The U.S. is simultaneously facing a concerted effort by a significant alliance of Latin American governments to erase any trace of U. …" @default.
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• W2396197218 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W2396197218 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2396197218 title "Russia in Latin America: A Strategic Analysis" @default.
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