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• W2414539856 abstract "There is no other way to destroy the Islamic State (or ISIS as it is commonly known) apart from the substantial commitment of ground forces. In the absence of viable alternatives to the Bashar al-Assad regime (whose demise is the Obama administration's expressed objective), the weakness and incompetence of the Iraqi government, and Turkey's doubtful commitment, exclusive reliance on air attacks is an assured recipe for a strategic stalemate that will enable a degraded ISIS to consolidate its position and to inculcate its ethos into both the society it controls and widening international pools of cohorts. This will in turn make future ground intervention a far tougher and bloodier experience.The Coming Strategic StalemateWhat was optimistically termed the spring has since evolved into what looks like a long and ghastly jihadist winter, in which ISIS has seized the leading role for a number of reasons:The weakness of Iraqi and Syrian security forces. Even before ISIS's conquest of Ramadi (late 2014-early 2015) and Palmyra (May 2015), some 30,000 anti-ISIS troops and Shiite militia took a month's time and heavy casualties to retake the notvery-heavily defended town of Tikrit while the late 2015 Ramadi offensive took several months to recapture a largely deserted city held by a small number of ISIS defenders.1 A large part of the regular Iraqi security forces (ISF) will need to be comprehensively rebuilt, a task widely expected to take years.2 AntiISIS militias, with the possible exception of Hezbollah, are generally much better at defending than attacking and have not been notably effective on the offensive. For example, in the battle for Tikrit in March 2015, while the Shiite militias claimed they were being deliberately slow in their advance, this was probably just doublespeak to explain lack of progress due to heavy casualties on the ground.3While usually more highly rated as fighters, the Kurdish militias may also be of uncertain capability.4 In any case, it is questionable whether the Kurdish peshmerga will be willing to expend lives capturing traditionally ethnic Arab areas from ISIS except for those parts they might ultimately want to include in an independent Kurdish state.In Syria, Assad regime forces, heavily supported by Russia as well as Iran and its Hezbollah proxy, have been unable to do much more than maintain a stalemate with the very fragmented insurgents. The burgeoning Russian intervention, which has not yet fully engaged ISIS, is unlikely to do much more than escalate the stalemate because the Assad regime has admitted that its basic problem is a lack of manpower, and Russian air strikes and a couple thousand Iranian and Hezbollah fighters will not change that.5The effectiveness of ISIS forces. The self-proclaimed Islamic State has built a reasonably effective military that so far has been able to contain enemy forces in Syria and Iraq.6 Credible past estimates placed the size of its military at more than 50,000.7 Reasonably well-trained militias that are willing to die can be a tough fight for even well-trained troops, especially in urban areas, as was demonstrated during the second battle of Fallujah in Iraq in 2004.8The consolidation of control. ISIS has established a minimally functional governing regime in the areas it controls and has ruthlessly worked to suppress or co-opt any potential opposition in those areas.9 So far, it has managed to avoid provoking a major rebellion of the Sunni Arab tribes as happened in the 2006 Anbar Awakening during the previous round of the Iraqi civil war. Even if a popular rebellion were to arise that ISIS could not immediately suppress, the most likely result would be a situation parallel to Syria with a multi-sided civil war in which ISIS would be at least strong enough to maintain control over significant areas.Any major attempt by a fundamentally unreformed Iraqi government to retake Sunni Arab majority areas-especially if attempted by Shiite militias or Iranian troops-is all too likely to be viewed by the Sunnis as an attempted re-conquest by a hostile Shiite regime. …" @default.
• W2414539856 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W2414539856 date "2016-06-01" @default.
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• W2414539856 title "Send Ground Forces to Destroy ISIS" @default.
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