FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2421019450> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2421019450 endingPage "453" @default.
• W2421019450 startingPage "427" @default.
• W2421019450 abstract "Abstract Building on arguments to political incomes, career concerns and elitist networks, this study assumes that an increasing percentage of highly incentivized former executive board members within the German Federal Government (1957–2012) will decrease the top earners’ average income tax rate during the subsequent year. Conversely, the percentage of lower incentivized former supervisory board members is assumed to increase the top earners’ average income tax rate. Both effects are assumed to be enforced if the ruling parties have strong support in the German Bundestag. The empirical results significantly confirm the unconditional effect for former executive board members and the conditional effect for former supervisory board members. Corresponding to sociological findings (see Hartmann 2002, Der Mythos von den Leistungseliten. Frankfurt a.M., Campus) and building on Barro’s (1973, The Control of Politicians: An Economic Model. Public Choice 14(1): 19–42) approach to the selfish maximization of political income and arguments regarding career concerns from principal agent theory (see, e. g. Fama 1980, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm. Journal of Political Economy 88, 288–307), this study assumes a strong incentive for former executive board members in the German Federal Government (1957–2012) to maximize their political income by lowering the top earners’ average income tax rate (1958–2013) due to their social elitist homogeneity and career concerns in terms of future job opportunities in business corporations. Conversely, former supervisory board members are assumed to increase the top earners’ average income tax rate due to their differing social backgrounds. Despite possible career concerns, they are assumed to increase the top earners’ average income tax rate in order not to lose their previously gained ideological credibility. Both effects are assumed to be enforced if the ruling parties have more than or equal to 55 % of seats in the German Bundestag. By running OLS and Tobit regressions, the empirical results confirm an unconditional decreasing effect of a higher percentage of previous executive board members and a conditional increasing effect of a higher percentage of previous supervisory board members on the top earners’ average income tax rate." @default.
• W2421019450 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W2421019450 creator A5058084097 @default.
• W2421019450 date "2016-08-01" @default.
• W2421019450 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2421019450 title "It’s About Connections – How the Economic Network of the German Federal Government Affects the Top Earners’ Average Income Tax Rate" @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1562637643 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1566518344 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1755806058 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1852025369 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1970469559 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1982198149 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1982375873 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W1988703667 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2011373323 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2016561445 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2023091037 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2025183095 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2041562787 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2050904362 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2061434327 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2065190337 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2074612092 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2099068279 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2107903608 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2114519928 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2130584850 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2149951978 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2156555532 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2160184254 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2162567842 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2162874840 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W2752617332 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3024840714 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3121686291 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3121719194 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3123323948 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3125247676 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3125309675 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W4256434286 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W4293229472 @default.
• W2421019450 cites W3122759333 @default.
• W2421019450 doi "https://doi.org/10.1515/jbnst-2015-1020" @default.
• W2421019450 hasPublicationYear "2016" @default.
• W2421019450 type Work @default.
• W2421019450 sameAs 2421019450 @default.
• W2421019450 citedByCount "1" @default.
• W2421019450 countsByYear W24210194502020 @default.
• W2421019450 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2421019450 hasAuthorship W2421019450A5058084097 @default.
• W2421019450 hasBestOaLocation W24210194502 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C100001284 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C145236788 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C154775046 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C165786947 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C166957645 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C2778137410 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C2779755355 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C4249254 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C514942387 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C551662922 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C556758197 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConcept C95457728 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C100001284 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C138885662 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C144133560 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C145236788 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C154775046 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C162324750 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C165786947 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C166957645 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C17744445 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C199539241 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C2778137410 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C2779755355 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C41895202 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C4249254 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C514942387 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C551662922 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C556758197 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C94625758 @default.
• W2421019450 hasConceptScore W2421019450C95457728 @default.
• W2421019450 hasIssue "4" @default.
• W2421019450 hasLocation W24210194501 @default.
• W2421019450 hasLocation W24210194502 @default.
• W2421019450 hasOpenAccess W2421019450 @default.
• W2421019450 hasPrimaryLocation W24210194501 @default.
• W2421019450 hasRelatedWork W1523415989 @default.
• W2421019450 hasRelatedWork W1569775080 @default.
• W2421019450 hasRelatedWork W190904951 @default.
• W2421019450 hasRelatedWork W1994932783 @default.

• next