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• W2463162987 abstract "Considering the international impacts of the Crimean Crisis, the academic community's almost complete ignorance of Crimea's domestic politics during the last several years seems strange. After Crimea's separatism in the early and middle 1990s declined,1 researchers ceased paying serious attention to its domestic politics. For example, The Crimea: Europe's Next Flashpoint? by Taras Kuzio, published in November 2010, carefully analyzed the Kharkiv agreement between Ukraine and Russia (which extended the Russian navy's use of Sevastopol in exchange for allegedly cheaper natural gas) in April 2010 and its aftermath. Yet this book has no mention of the Crimean Supreme Rada session held in March of the same year, which established Vladimir Konstantinov's chairmanship, confirmed Vasily Dzharty's premiership,2 and accordingly had great significance for the further history of Crimea. A rare exception are Andrew Wilson's brief references to Dzharty and Anatoly Mogilev's governments, described in 2013 in the context of the Crimean Tatar issue.3 Considering this research tradition, it is hardly surprising that researchers often regard the Crimean elite as no more than the Kremlin's puppet, who performed their role according to a scenario written by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Disagreeing with this interpretation, this essay argues that Russia's annexation of Crimea was in fact the result of interactions between the domestic politics of Crimea and the Kremlin's intentions.An outline of this essay is as follows. To make Crimea a bastion for his victory in the 2010 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych dispatched to Crimea a group of Party of Regions (POR) leaders from the city of (Makiivka in Ukrainian), which is next door to Donetsk. The Crimeans nicknamed them from Makeevka and Donetsk, ridiculing their colonialist desires. The Crimeans accepted the Macedonians' leadership, as long as the latter secured Yanukovych's victory in the presidential election in 2010 and subsequently pumped out abundant subsidies from his administration to develop Crimea. Nevertheless, cultural tensions persisted. In the eyes of the Macedonians, the Crimeans were lazy, corrupted, and patronistic. The Macedonians openly claimed that Crimea was the Central Asia of Ukraine.4 The radicalization of the Euromaidan Revolution brought to the surface this potential tension between the indigenous5 Crimean elites and the Macedonians. The Macedonians, headed by the Crimean prime minister Anatoly Mogilev, found it possible to cooperate with the newly born Euromaidan government that came to power after Yanukovych's ouster. The indigenous Crimean elites categorically rejected this idea, fearing the export of violence from the Maidan to Crimea. They removed Mogilev from his post and asked Russia for help.Crimean separatism is different from Donbass separatism. The Donetsk People's Republic leaders and ideologues often explain that a culturally polarized Ukraine was a fragile state from the beginning and that when political actors lost the spirit of compromise, it inevitably collapsed.6 In contrast, the Crimeans tend to maintain that the violence released by the Euromaidan Revolution terrified Crimea and Donbass, which saw no alternative but to escape from Ukraine (a situational interpretation). It is paradoxical that the Donbass ideologues' view is more primordial than that of the Crimeans, to whom the standard Ukrainian culture was more alien than to the Donbass population. Indeed, having interviewed a number of Crimean politicians and ideologues since 2013, I never heard Eurasianist rhetoric from them, in contrast to DPR leaders' commitment to this ideology (as described in fn. 6 and also by Marlene Laruelle).7 What is also impressive is that the discursive richness around Crimea's territorial status and identity, which Gwendolyn Sasse analyzed in her monograph,8 played no role in the political struggles in Crimea from December 2013 to March 2014, in contrast to Crimean politics in the first half of the 1990s. …" @default.
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• W2463162987 date "2016-03-22" @default.
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• W2463162987 title "Domestic Politics in Crimea, 2009-2015" @default.
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