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• W246849938 abstract "INTRODUCTION The academic study of decisionmaking has grown in recent years and has consequently become more elaborate. Careful consideration of decisionmaking would seem fundamental to any legal analysis, which depends upon judges to interpret, apply, and enforce the law. While political scientists have long investigated such decisionmaking, legal research has too frequently retreated to a comfortable but unsupported assumption that judges have simply followed the law when deciding cases. Reliance on this assumption, which converts judges into either saints or automatons, cannot be sustained. The of decisionmaking requires a more refined investigation. This Article presents an analysis of the institutional context of decisionmaking and of how that context affects decisions. The first Part discusses the conventional models of decisionmaking. First, we review the legal the traditional formalist view of judging. Second, we consider the political model propounded by some political scientists, which maintains that judges do nothing more than decide cases according to their ideological preferences. Third, we consider a more elaborate model, in which judges attend to the preferences of other institutions, such as Congress and the Presidency, strategically altering their decisions in light of those external preferences. The second Part analyzes how other institutions might affect Supreme Court decisionmaking. Legal research has focused primarily on the legislature's ability to overturn the statutory interpretation decisions of the courts. We suggest that this, in fact, is probably not a significant factor in decisionmaking. However, the courts are more likely to be responsive to other sources of influence, ranging from threats of impeachment to controls on jurisdiction to budgetary pressures to reluctance to implement the spirit or the letter of the courts' opinions. Cumulatively, these influences are potentially significant and may substantially impact decisionmaking. In the third Part, we present an empirical test that focuses on the institutional component of the Supreme Court's decisionmaking. We present an analysis of thousands of Supreme Court votes and try to identify a political and a legal basis for the decisionmaking. We also identify the presence of deference to other institutions and the extent to which this deference appears to be strategic. We conclude that there is clear evidence of strategic deference to other institutions but that such a response does not overwhelm the decisionmaking process, which considers a blend of ideological and legal factors as well. No single simple accurately explains the process of Supreme Court decisions. I. MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING The decisionmaking process has not been much explored. It cannot be so explored unless one confronts the issue of what the objectives of judges are. The judicial maximand differs from that of ordinary market actors because judges cannot readily enhance their income via the quantity or quality of the job they do. Sundry factors doubtless affect judges, including the desire not to be overworked.1 When judges do make decisions, though, we need a of why they decide as they do. This Part of our Article explores three distinct models of decisionmaking. First we consider the naive legal model, which might also be called neutralist decisionmaking. This has judges faithfully applying legal principles, such as precedent, in order to reach a decision. Legal scholars often assume that judges are using this approach, but the assumption is seldom supported with evidence. A second is the naive political model, which is sometimes called the attitudinal model. This is commonly employed in political science and holds that judges generally make decisions that accord with their ideological or political preferences. …" @default.
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• W246849938 date "2001-07-01" @default.
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• W246849938 title "Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Decisionmaking" @default.
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