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• W2481480800 abstract "No AccessDec 2013Revisiting the Case for Public Guarantees: A Frictions-Based ApproachAuthors/Editors: Deniz Anginer, Augusto de la Torre, Alain IzeDeniz AnginerSearch for more papers by this author, Augusto de la TorreSearch for more papers by this author, Alain IzeSearch for more papers by this authorhttps://doi.org/10.1596/978-0-8213-9828-9_ch7AboutView ChaptersFull TextPDF (0.1 MB) ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareFacebookTwitterLinked In Abstract: Concludes that based on a review of the theoretical foundations of public guarantees, the commonly used justifications for public guarantees based solely on agency frictions on un-internalized externalities remain flawed. When idiosyncratic risk exists, justification of public guarantees depends solely on risk aversion. The state can spread risk more finely than markets by coordinating atomistic agents that would otherwise not organize themselves to solve monitoring or commitment problems. When systematic risk exists, the state adds value not by spreading the risk but by directly limiting it through better coordination among agents. In all cases, the analysis calls for exploiting more fully the natural complementarities between the state and the markets in bearing risk. In turn, this effort also requires overcoming agency frictions between the managers and the owners of development banks, a process that may entail a significant reshaping of development banks’ mandates, governance, and risk management systems. ReferencesArping, S, G Loranth, and A D Morrison. 2010. “Public Initiatives to Support Entrepreneurs: Credit Guarantees versus Co-funding.” Journal of Financial Stability 6 (1): 26–35. 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CrossrefGoogle Scholar Previous chapterNext chapter FiguresreferencesRecommendeddetails View Published: December 2013ISBN: 978-0-8213-9828-9e-ISBN: 978-0-8213-9956-9 Copyright & Permissions Related RegionsLatin America & CaribbeanRelated TopicsFinance and Financial Sector Development KeywordsBANK SUPERVISIONCAPITAL GUARANTEESDEVELOPMENT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSDFISFINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTFINANCIAL SECTORRISK AVERSIONRISK MANAGEMENT PDF DownloadLoading ..." @default.
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