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• W2504635529 abstract "THE DIRECT /INDIRECT DISTINCTION IN MORALS T HE PRINCIPAL TOOL within the Catholic moral tradition for dealing with conflict-situations has been the principle of double effect. Reflecting upon and expanding certain remarks of Aquinas on the indirect voluntary, moralists have refined the principle and applied it to an increasing number of moral issues since the second half of the 16th century up to the pre.sent day.1 The central nerve of the principle is the notion that evil should never be the object of direct intention whether as an end (per se et propter se) or as a means to a good end (per se sed non propter se) . Three of the four well-known conditions for legitimate application of the principle are aimed at insuring indirect voluntariety (a permitting rather than an intending will) relative to an act which one foresees will have both a good and an evil effect. First, the finis operis, the inner object or constitutive intentionality of the act itself, as distinguished from the effects of the act, must be morally good or at least indifferent. Just as in structuralist thought a literary piece has an intersubjective intentionality or 1 For Aquinas, the indirect voluntary refers to the foreseen but unwilled effect of an omission, (cf. I-II, q. 6, a. 3). It was Medina, Vasquez and their followers of the latter half of the 16th century who extended the concept to apply rather to the foreseen but unintended effect of a commission. Cf. J. Ghoos, L'acte a double effet, Ephemerides Theologicae Lovaniensis, 1951, v. 27, pp. 30-52. J. Ghoos, whom I here follow, disagrees with J. Mangan who believes that Aquinas actually developed the notion of the indirect voluntary to apply to commissions in his article on self-defense (II-II q. 64, a. 7) and that subsequent authors perfected the principle of double effect in meditation upon this article; cf. An Historical Analysis of the Principle of Double Effect, Theological Studies, 1949, v. 10, pp. 41-61. P. Knauer disagrees with Ghoos's criticisms of Mangan; cf. The Hermeneutical Function of the Principle of Double Effect, Natural LOJW Forum, 1967, v. rn, p. 183. An earlier study which Mangan attacks and Ghoos defends is that of V. Alonso, El principio del doble efecto- en los comentadores de Santo Tomas de Aquino, Rome, 1937. 350 DOUBLE EFFECT I INDIRECT ACTION 351 life of its own independent of the intentions of the author, so in traditional moral theology an act is viewed in its immediate and constitutive result (finis operis) as having an intersubjective moral meaning independent of the concrete intention of the agent and the consequences of the act. This finis operis, moreover, is the principal moral index; if it is morally evil the act can never be deemed objectively good, but at best subjectively inculpable due to extrinsic guilt-reducing factors such as ignorance, fear, passion and the like. The second condition is that the agent's intention must encompass only the good effect of the act and not the evil effect. The third condition is that the evil effect of the act must not mediate the good effect; the evil effect must not be the means willed whereby the good effect is produced. There is a fourth condition, viz., that there must be a proportionate reason for positing such a polyvalent moral act. This last condition has little bearing upon ensuring the indirect voluntariety of the act and can be viewed as a teleological or quasi-utilitarian consideration about consequences . It concerns more directly the production of the good than the deontological rightness or fittingness of the act. I Until recently most twentieth century Catholic authors have acknowledged the broad moral relevance of the principle of double effect and of the embodied distinction between an intending (direct) and permitting (indirect) will. During the last decade, however, several authors, led by P. Knauer,2 have insisted that in analyzing the moral meaning of a human decision , we have considered the act posited too abstractly and absolutely, treating it too readily as a unit of meaning which is by itself susceptible of a moral index.8 These authors prefer 2..." @default.
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• W2504635529 date "1977-01-01" @default.
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• W2504635529 title "The Direct/Indirect Distinction in Morals" @default.
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