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• W252392719 abstract "ABSTRACT Technological superiority never equates to warfighting superiority unless technically advanced weapon systems are fielded when soldiers need them. ********** The former Under Secretary of Defense, Donald J. Atwood, on 28 May 1992 summarized the Department of Defense's new acquisition strategy: Our new approach places increased reliance on research and technology development to maintain our advantage. We are making greater use of technology demonstrators and prototypes in the development of new weapon systems, and not all new weapons will automatically go into production. We will incorporate new technology into It current system only when fully proven and there is genuine need for improved performance or reliability. Full scale production of new weapon systems will occur only when there is a definite need because of obsolescence or aging of an existing system and when it is proven cost effective. (1) The new acquisition strategy will succeed or fail depending on how well it meets users' needs. This chapter looks to recent history to prove this point. At the onset of the Korean war, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the 24th Division to proceed from Japan to Korea on 30 June 1950. He ordered a small task force from the division flown into Korea ahead of the main body to engage the North Korean Army as quickly as possible. A small delaying force, Task Force Smith, part of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, landed at Pusan Airfield on the southeast tip of Korea on 1 and 2 July, with Lieutanant Colonel Charles B. Smith in command. Colonel Smith's delaying force was sent forward to engage the enemy on sight. South of Seoul, the task force dug hasty positions on the night of 4 July and awaited the approaching North Koreans. Shortly after 08:00 on 5 July, the North Koreans appeared. The Americans stood until they had expended their ammunition, then retreated under fire, suffering heavy losses as they were overwhelmed. This is T. R. Fehrenbach's account of what happened: The enemy tanks were now only two thousand yards in front of the infantry foxholes and still coming. Bursting HE shells blasted into the tank column, spattering the advancing armor with flame and steel and mud. Jesus Christ, they're still coming! an American infantry-man shouted. Colonel Smith now ordered the 75mm recoilless rifles to hold their fire until the tanks got within 700 yards. Moments later, at 700 yards, both recoilless rifles slammed at the advancing tanks. Round after round burst against the T-34 turrets, with no apparent effect. Alerted by this opposition, the tanks stopped and turned their machine guns on the ridge where the Americans had fired. The tanks fired their machine guns, ripping and clawing the hillsides. Suddenly, American soldiers dove for any cover they could find. Lieutenant Ollie Connor, watching, grabbed a bazooka and ran down to the ditch, alongside the road. Steadying his 2.36-inch rocket launcher on the nearest tank, only fifteen yards away, Connor let fly. Nothing--the small shaped charge burned out against the thick Russian armor without penetrating. Angrily, Connor fired again, this time at the rear of the tank where the armor protection was supposed to be thinnest. He fired twenty-two rockets, none of which did any damage. (2) There was nothing mysterious about the Russian T-34. It had been used against the German panzers in front of Moscow in the early 1940s. Some said the T-34 was the best all-around tank used in World War II. It could be stopped--but not with the obsolete equipment in the hands of the U.S. soldiers in Task Force Smith. Their weapons were useless against the enemy armor. After World War II, the United States had developed improved 3.5-inch rocket launchers that would penetrate the T-34. …" @default.
• W252392719 created "2016-06-24" @default.
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• W252392719 date "1993-08-01" @default.
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• W252392719 title "4 Technology Timeliness from a Soldier's Perspective" @default.
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