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• W2531657573 abstract "I. INTRODUCTIONIn the context of federal antitrust law, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine protects petitions to the government,1 as well as any action taken by the government resulting from such petitions, from antitrust liability.2 The Noerr-Pennington doctrine itself is nothing more than a series of holdings reflecting the fundamental principle that while antitrust law operates to prohibit certain anticompetitive conduct by private parties, it has no dominion over the government. Immunity under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine extends to efforts to influence all three branches of the government at every level.3 The doctrine thus provides a very powerful defense against any antitrust claim as long as the alleged violation falls within the definition of governmental petitioning.Application of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine is broadest in the adjudicative process. Whereas efforts to lobby the legislature and the executive branch are generally constrained to established avenues of political persuasion, petitioning the judiciary can be accomplished in a variety of non-traditional ways as long as it is incidental to litigation.4 For example, instituting a legitimate lawsuit, threatening litigation, and reaching a settlement agreement are all protected forms of petitioning.5This note explores the boundary of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine as it applies to certain areas of litigation by first providing a brief history on the development of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, examining the sham exception, and discussing the doctrine's applicability to incidents of litigation. Next, the note briefly analyzes the operation of the doctrine in cases involving refusals to grant licenses, and provides insight on a recent development of the commercial exception. Finally, the note discusses why the Noerr-Pennington exception may not always apply to petitions seeking approval from state regulatory bodies.II. BASIS FOR THE MODERN-DAY EXCEPTIONIn Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court held that direct petitions to the government for legislation are immune from federal antitrust laws and that the claims to the government by the petitioning party are also immune, even though intended to eliminate competition.7 In Noerr, the defendant railroad companies, threatened by the burgeoning trucking industry, employed unscrupulous and vicious tactics in their efforts to lobby the government to pass legislation and adopt law enforcement practices that would impede the progress of their competition.8 The plaintiffs described the defendant railroad companies' campaign to eliminate them as competitors as fraudulent, one which utilized the third-party technique of circulating publicity matter made to appear as spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it was largely prepared and produced by [a public relations firm] and paid for by the railroads.9 The plaintiffs brought suit for violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act10 alleging that the defendants had conspired to restrain trade and monopolize the long-distance freight hauling industry.11 Despite the reprehensible methods used by the defendants to influence the government, the Court held that they were absolutely immune from antitrust scrutiny because the restraint of trade or was the result of valid governmental action.12Writing for the majority, Justice Black rested his decision in Noerr for immunity largely on precedent which he determined dictated the following:[T]he Sherman Act forbids only those trade restraints and monopolizations that are created, or attempted, by the acts of individuals or combinations of individuals or corporations. Accordingly, it has been held that where a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid governmental action, as opposed to private action, no violation of the Act can be out.13Justice Black stated that the policy behind the principle of immunity was that under our form of government, the legislature holds the responsibility of deciding whether a law should be passed or enforced as long as the law does not violate the Constitution. …" @default.
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• W2531657573 date "2004-01-01" @default.
• W2531657573 modified "2023-09-26" @default.
• W2531657573 title "Exploring the Boundary of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in the Adjudicative Process" @default.
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