FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2555273477> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2555273477 endingPage "225" @default.
• W2555273477 startingPage "217" @default.
• W2555273477 abstract "Reciprocity is a leading potential explanatory mechanism for the evolution of cooperation between nonkin. It relies upon individuals possessing information about their opponents' behaviour, but in reality this information is probably often imperfect. Different possible strategies for dealing with imperfect information include optimism (cooperate when information is unavailable) or pessimism (defect when information is unavailable). How do the strategies individuals use to cope with imperfect information when deciding whether to cooperate or defect influence the stability of reciprocity? Our previous work (Kurokawa, 2016, Letters on Evolutionary Behavioral Science, 7, 14–16) showed that the conditions under which reciprocity evolves are unaffected by whether reciprocators are optimistic or pessimistic. However, this argument is based on an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) analysis against defectors and does not consider the situation where there are heterogeneous reciprocators with different levels of optimism. In this study, by conducting an ESS analysis, I found that optimism evolves when the cost-to-benefit ratio (i.e. the ratio of the cost of cooperating to the benefit of being cooperated with) is low, whereas pessimism evolves when the cost-to-benefit ratio is high, in contrast to the results of the previous study. I also considered the case where unconditional cooperators and defectors exist and found that optimistic reciprocators are invaded by pessimistic reciprocators when the cost-to-benefit ratio is high and by unconditional cooperators when the cost-to-benefit ratio is low, whereas pessimistic reciprocators are invaded by optimistic reciprocators when the cost-to-benefit ratio is low and unconditional defectors when the cost-to-benefit ratio is high. Thus, both optimistic and pessimistic reciprocators are subject to invasion whether the cost-to-benefit ratio is high or low, suggesting that reciprocity is evolutionarily unstable. This result is consistent with a previous empirical study (Clutton-Brock, 2009, Nature, 462, 51–57), which reported that firm evidence of reciprocity in animal societies is rare." @default.
• W2555273477 created "2016-11-30" @default.
• W2555273477 creator A5035258817 @default.
• W2555273477 date "2016-12-01" @default.
• W2555273477 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2555273477 title "Evolutionary stagnation of reciprocators" @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1565379693 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1613733950 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1967472493 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1972176362 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1979970001 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1988667131 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1990336455 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1991736422 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1991741135 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1992976504 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W1997780729 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2001846609 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2009481751 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2013340500 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2014418004 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2018247211 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2033601694 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2037937930 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2045716049 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2046307793 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2048552633 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2051989242 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2052054359 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2053186044 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2056000877 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2059433670 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2062663664 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2063792498 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2065529435 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2071896042 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2079001684 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2082209213 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2096220157 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2096560528 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2102183630 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2109151729 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2117416263 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2121885874 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2138427174 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2138858908 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2150982213 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2157651345 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2161066873 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2164158682 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2167030552 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2167062553 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2168904520 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2171546425 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2172466273 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2259091452 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2314341646 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2323699886 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2344843069 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W2964098933 @default.
• W2555273477 cites W4211047284 @default.
• W2555273477 doi "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.anbehav.2016.09.014" @default.
• W2555273477 hasPublicationYear "2016" @default.
• W2555273477 type Work @default.
• W2555273477 sameAs 2555273477 @default.
• W2555273477 citedByCount "15" @default.
• W2555273477 countsByYear W25552734772016 @default.
• W2555273477 countsByYear W25552734772017 @default.
• W2555273477 countsByYear W25552734772018 @default.
• W2555273477 countsByYear W25552734772019 @default.
• W2555273477 countsByYear W25552734772020 @default.
• W2555273477 countsByYear W25552734772021 @default.
• W2555273477 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2555273477 hasAuthorship W2555273477A5035258817 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConcept C181370504 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConceptScore W2555273477C17744445 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConceptScore W2555273477C181370504 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConceptScore W2555273477C199539241 @default.
• W2555273477 hasConceptScore W2555273477C94625758 @default.
• W2555273477 hasLocation W25552734771 @default.
• W2555273477 hasOpenAccess W2555273477 @default.
• W2555273477 hasPrimaryLocation W25552734771 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W1661652296 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W2516434915 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W2885130534 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W2984502371 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W3042319461 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W3121246031 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W3122909470 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W3123072578 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W3125552202 @default.
• W2555273477 hasRelatedWork W3145248661 @default.
• W2555273477 hasVolume "122" @default.
• W2555273477 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2555273477 isRetracted "false" @default.

• next