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• W2562541013 abstract "The post-war experience with industrial growth in developing countries shows asUbstantial range of variation in terms of performance. Conventional economictheories have found it hard to explain why some countries such as South Koreahave done as well as they have while others like Bangladesh perform worsethan expected. The starting point of this thesis is to point out thatindustrial development involves processes of structural transformation whichin the modern context requires a substantial amount of state intervention.State intervention can be more or less efficient in terms of its ability todirect resources in ways which generate growth. Differences in the efficiencyof state intervention are then identified as a critical element in explanationsof differences in industrial performance. The rent-seeking literature offers anexplanation of the inefficiency of state intervention and this is criticallyexamined. Comparing South Korea with Bangladesh, we find that efficientsystems do not necessarily have lower state intervention or the associatedrent-seeking type corruption compared to inefficient systems. On the otherhand, in Bangladesh we find a lot of evidence of clientelism, which is definedas a system of payoffs to coalitions who have the organizational ability todisrupt income flows of patrons. Clientelist activity is much less in evidencein South Korea. These issues are discussed in Part I of the thesis.Part II develops a theoretical framework for examining some aspects of theefficiency of state intervention. Stability and efficiency are identified asalternative goals of state decision-makers who have the task of maintainingthe political and economic viability of the system above a minimum level. Theargument then uses developments in the property rights literature to identifythe nature of the tradeoff between stability and efficiency under differentinitial conditions. The rights underlying profits from asset ownership,clientelist payoffs and rents are identified. Since changes in rights affectincome flows, changes in rights have implications for the stability of thestate depending on the political organization of various constituencies. On theother hand, rights have implications for economic efficiency. The minimumconditions on rights for efficiency under various circumstances are identified.This allows us to develop the nature of the stability-efficiency trade off undervarious assumptions, and we see that this defines a political frontier forgrowth. With clientelism, the shape of the political frontier is shown to beparticularly unfavourable for efficient state intervention.Part III looks at the history of industrialization in Bangladesh in terms ofthe pointers provided by our model and finds that a number of phase changescan be identified in terms of the relative organizational power of differentconstituencies which conceptually changed the position of the politicalfrontier over time. The success of industrial policy coincides fairly well withthese changes in the political frontier.For reasons of length, Part IV is presented as a summary and the original textis presented in an appendix which the examiners may consult but need not readin detail. Part IV examines the empirical evidence. Unlike South Korea orTaiwan, productivity performance in industry in Bangladesh follows a cyclicalpattern. These cycles coincide with the changes in the political frontieridentified in Part Ill. We also look at demand and supply side explanations ofpoor performance and find them to be insufficient on their own. On the otherhand, we find statistical evidence that clientelist payoffs are a feature ofthe Bangladeshi industrial sector while there is little evidence of suchpayoffs in South ' Korea. The thesis thus points out the importance ofidentifying clientelist processes with greater precision and suggests thatindustrial policy in countries like Bangladesh requires as a precondition ofsuccess, institutional, contractual and political responses which can counterclientelist strategies." @default.
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• W2562541013 date "1989-07-14" @default.
• W2562541013 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2562541013 title "Clientelism, corruption and capitalist development : an analysis of state intervention, with special reference to Bangladesh" @default.
• W2562541013 doi "https://doi.org/10.17863/cam.16517" @default.
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