FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2573027557> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2573027557 endingPage "1054" @default.
• W2573027557 startingPage "1049" @default.
• W2573027557 abstract "The Virtues and Vices of Biased Rationality: An Eco-Cognitive Account Emanuele Bardone (bardone@unipv.it) Department of Philosophy, University of Pavia P.zza Botta, 6 - 27100 Pavia, Italy Lorenzo Magnani (lmagnani@unipv.it) Department of Philosophy, University of Pavia P.zza Botta, 6 - 27100 Pavia, Italy Abstract human learning becomes an option ecologically supported by the accumulation of knowledge in the human cognitive niche. In order to provide ground to this idea, we will employ the lens model introduced by Egon Brunswik to give ground to our proposal. This paper aims at illustrating the virtues and vices of biased rationality. Starting with the virtues of biased rationality, we will illustrate the idea of Homo Heuristicus along with its fal- lacious dimension. We will claim that the rationale of biased rationality consists in turning ignorance into a cognitive virtue. More precisely, we will argue that biases provide us with pre- missory starting points even in absence of relevant information to solve the problem at hand. In the second part, we will turn to the vices of biased rationality: we will contend that the adap- tive value of fallacies are limited to those situations in which we do not have (relevant) information, whereas being in such a situation is not adaptive at all. In the last part of the paper we will illustrate our main contention according to which de- bising rationality is made possible when human learning be- comes an option ecologically supported by the accumulation of knowledge in the human cognitive niche. In order to provide ground to this idea, we will employ the lens model introduced by Egon Brunswik. Keywords: biased rationality; fallacy; heuristics; de-biasing; lens model; cognitive niche Introducing the Homo Heuristicus Introduction This paper aims at illustrating the virtues and vices of biased rationality. Starting with the virtues of biased rationality, we will illustrate the idea of Homo Heuristicus along with its fal- lacious dimension. In this first section, we will claim that the rationale of biased rationality consists in turning ignorance into a cognitive virtue. More precisely, we will argue that bi- ases (basically, resulting from fallacious reasoning) provide us with premissory starting points even in absence of relevant information to solve the problem at hand. This will permit us to develop the idea that a fallacy (or bias) does not necessary lead to a bad outcome. Accordingly, it can be either a good or bad line of argument. This is due to the fact that an argument is fallacious or biased with relation to a standard or a set of standards. In the second part, we will introduce the distinction be- tween competence-independent information and competence- dependent information. Building on this distinction, we will maintain that the adaptive role of biased rationality is condi- tional, as it lacks what we call symptomaticity. That is, the adaptive value of fallacies are limited to those situations in which we do not have (relevant) information, whereas being in such a situation is not adaptive at all. The last part of the paper is an attempt to furnish a more general account about how decisions may be effectively un- biased by adopting a different perspective. Our main thesis is that, biased rationality turns out to be much less successful, as In this section we are going to explore the very idea of biased rationality by illustrating the idea of homo heuristicus intro- duced and developed during the last two decades by Gigeren- zer and colleagues (cf. (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2003; Gigerenzer, 2000; Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009)). The idea of homo heuristicus explicitly addresses the problem of how to make two apparently conflicting concepts consistent: accuracy as the result of a certain decision, and effort as the amount of resources deployed in the decision- making process. The idea of homo heuristicus stems from the rejection of two main assumptions about accuracy and effort. The first is that a heuristic always involves a trade-off to be reached between accuracy and effort, as they are basically conflict- ing concepts. In fact, accuracy usually involves time and resources. Therefore, given the fact that humans operate in cognitive economy with limited time and resources, they have to rely on decisions that are accurate enough, meaning that they might simply have to discard those strategies which lead to more accurate outcomes, but require greater resources. Heuristics are thought to be strategies reaching an accuracy- effort trade-off. The second assumption can be called the “principle of to- tal evidence”. The principle of total evidence – introduced by Carnap (Carnap, 1947) and explicitly mentioned by Gigeren- zer and colleagues – states that it is always better to take into account the total evidence available in order to determine whether or not a certain hypothesis or course of action is jus- tified or rational: that is, having more information is always better than having less information. Or, to put it simply, more is always more, and less is always less. Contrary to these two beliefs, Gigerenzer and colleagues argued, and managed to provide empirical evidence to sup- port the idea, that heuristics are not always accuracy-effort trade-offs. On certain occasions, one can attain higher ac- curacy with less effort. Besides, more information may be detrimental leading not only to overload, but also to a general state of ignorance. Putting it simply, less is more and more is" @default.
• W2573027557 created "2017-01-26" @default.
• W2573027557 creator A5014761588 @default.
• W2573027557 creator A5066089479 @default.
• W2573027557 date "2011-01-01" @default.
• W2573027557 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2573027557 title "The Virtues and Vices of Biased Rationality: An Eco-Cognitive Account" @default.
• W2573027557 cites W1588881365 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W1986781756 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W1989020845 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2024694940 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2071497152 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2094632212 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2105538900 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2112156109 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2149935529 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2156452244 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2157581667 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2334811914 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W2610692054 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W582661317 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W593551732 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W604191698 @default.
• W2573027557 cites W826716118 @default.
• W2573027557 hasPublicationYear "2011" @default.
• W2573027557 type Work @default.
• W2573027557 sameAs 2573027557 @default.
• W2573027557 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2573027557 crossrefType "proceedings-article" @default.
• W2573027557 hasAuthorship W2573027557A5014761588 @default.
• W2573027557 hasAuthorship W2573027557A5066089479 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C10437067 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C169760540 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C169900460 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C173871420 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C182306322 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C18903297 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C201717286 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C202444582 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C2777239683 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C2778732403 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C33676613 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C33923547 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C10138342 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C10437067 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C111472728 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C138885662 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C144024400 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C15744967 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C162324750 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C169760540 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C169900460 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C173871420 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C182306322 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C18903297 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C201717286 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C202444582 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C2777239683 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C2778732403 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C33676613 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C33923547 @default.
• W2573027557 hasConceptScore W2573027557C86803240 @default.
• W2573027557 hasIssue "33" @default.
• W2573027557 hasLocation W25730275571 @default.
• W2573027557 hasOpenAccess W2573027557 @default.
• W2573027557 hasPrimaryLocation W25730275571 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W180094753 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W1875498233 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2008579124 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2044940643 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2372365608 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2402417320 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2498283304 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W275156941 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2767228143 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W2959239433 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3083610813 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3121816311 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3122904579 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3128484210 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3148419764 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3148833340 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3158188148 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W61668406 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W88242503 @default.
• W2573027557 hasRelatedWork W3124741081 @default.
• W2573027557 hasVolume "33" @default.
• W2573027557 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2573027557 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2573027557 magId "2573027557" @default.
• W2573027557 workType "article" @default.