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• W2587600766 abstract "Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats:In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations Chung-in Moon (bio) Inter-Korean relations have hit rock bottom. Since President Park Geun-hye’s inauguration in February 2013, her government pursued the Trust-Building Process on the Korean Peninsula initiative and tried to improve ties with North Korea. But such efforts have failed, and inter-Korean relations have worsened.1 After North Korea’s fourth nuclear test in January 2016, the Park government adopted a much tougher stance by closing the Kaesong industrial complex and completely suspending inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. Seoul and Washington have also intensified joint military exercises and training on deploying strategic weapons. Pyongyang responded to these moves by conducting numerous missile test launches and by undertaking an additional nuclear test in September. A vicious cycle of action and reaction has heightened inter-Korean military tension, which has deepened public anxiety. The North and the South are engaging in a dangerous game of chicken without any channels of communication, increasing the risk that an accidental clash may well escalate into a full-blown military conflict. Over the past seven years—while the six-party talks have been derailed—North Korea is believed to have steadily amassed nuclear materials and is now estimated to possess more than ten nuclear warheads. Pyongyang has so far conducted five nuclear tests in total and acquired short-range Scud-type missiles, intermediate-range Nodong and Musudan missiles, and even submarine-launched ballistic missiles. It is also close to developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and claims to have made progress miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear warheads as well. The North Korean nuclear threat is thus no longer fictional but real and poses serious security threats to the peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and the world. North Korean nuclear weapons would significantly alter the [End Page 74] military balance on the Korean Peninsula and ultimately impede peaceful coexistence there. The regional security impacts are also profound—a nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast Asia. And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear materials, technology, and even warheads to other regions, threatening the very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism. Against this backdrop, this essay provides a critical assessment of existing strategies to deal with the North Korean nuclear deadlock by focusing on sanctions and other pressures, deterrence and missile defense, and preemptive attack and nuclear armament. It then suggests dialogue and negotiation as a viable alternative. The Limited Effectiveness of Sanctions and Other Pressures The Park Geun-hye government has responded to the threats from North Korea by employing a variety of countermeasures ranging from sanctions and other pressures to deterrence, preemptive strikes, and defense. Its preferred method of managing Pyongyang’s unruly behavior has so far been sanctions. The Park administration strongly believes that North Korea’s crimes (possession of nuclear weapons and violation of UN resolutions) should be punished by comprehensive and forceful sanctions and that such sanctions can compel the North and its leader, Kim Jong-un, to choose a path toward denuclearization. Otherwise, the Kim regime will risk collapse. But sanctions have not been effective. Despite the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, North Korea has not shown signs of compliance. On the contrary, its behavior has become more defiant, with the Kim regime conducting a fifth nuclear test and additional missile tests. North Korea is still a closed society and is very much accustomed to sanctions. Moreover, China does not want to go ahead with any sanctions that would undermine stability in the North and lead to regime collapse. Given that 91.3% of North Korea’s trade is with China, as of December 2015, international sanctions cannot be effective without Beijing’s full cooperation.2 As sanctions and other pressures have not produced any tangible outcomes, the South Korean government has not only strengthened its deterrence posture but also begun to adopt a more assertive defense stance, especially against a potential North Korean missile attack. This deterrence [End Page 75] strategy is composed of three elements. The first is deterrence against the North by implementing a kill chain predicated on improved missile and..." @default.
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• W2587600766 date "2017-01-01" @default.
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• W2587600766 title "Managing North Korean Nuclear Threats: In Defense of Dialogue and Negotiations" @default.
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• W2587600766 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/asp.2017.0011" @default.
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