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• W2587858556 abstract "Japan's ChoiceThe year 2015 saw advances of two major economic initiatives, the US-promoted Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). These two initiatives address different economic needs in the region. But the geoeconomics surrounding the initiatives are worth comparing, as they emerged from the desire of the regional superpowers to secure the rules of economic exchange. As a result, both the TPP and the AIIB are likely to have profound effects on Asia's regional economic governance in the near future, and will shape the contours of economic norms in the Asia Pacific and beyond. As the tug-of-war for international support between the United States and China proceeds, Japan has decided to join in the TPP and stay out of the AIIB, at least for now. Why is the Japanese government enthusiastic about the TPP when this agreement promotes the type of trade liberalization that Japan has resisted since the 1970s, in both repeated bilateral trade talks with the United States and in multilateral forums such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)? Why should Japan be reluctant to support the AIIB, which aims to increase infrastructure investment in Asia-the same method that Japanese foreign aid has used, for the past six decades, to build up the foundation of the region's economic development? What has Japan gained and what has it lost by taking these contrasting positions? How do Japan's positions on these matters influence the power balance surrounding economic governance of the Asia-Pacific region?At first glance, the contrasting choices appear to suggest that the Japanese government is making decisions based on security considerations, and favoring its American ally's initiative over its regional rival China. A somewhat more nuanced explanation is that the Japanese government tends to be sensitive to US preferences due to Japan's dependence on both the security umbrella of its ally and access to its market. And, because of historical and territorial tensions and the fear of a rising China, Japan would never support China's regional initiative, even though Japanese businesses would stand to gain from infrastructure projects through AIIB funding.But the reasons behind Japan's economic policy choices are much more complex than the security or balance of power arguments. For starters, despite possible economic returns and political gains from supporting the US policy initiative, Japan was very reluctant to join the TPP, given that domestic opposition was so strong. It took the Japanese government almost three years to join the TPP negotiation after former Prime Minister Naoto Kan announced plans to do so in 2010. In addition, Japan has shown no intention of containing China or limiting China's access to the US market, particularly because an increasing number of Japanese manufacturers use China as an export platform for their products. In fact, Japan, as well as many in the United States, wants China to join the TPP in the future to make it a more widely encompassing agreement. In the area of finance, Japan once proposed an Asia-only alternative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was called the Asian Monetary Fund at the time of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Although this idea never materialized, it is important to note that Japan has since engaged in regional financial initiatives, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative, in collaboration with China and without the United States. The Japanese government often shares similar concerns as China about the state of the regional economy, in contrast to the argument that it always prioritizes US interests. Finally, Japan's business interests are complex, and pursuing only old-style infrastructure investments, as advanced by the AIIB, is not sufficient. Given these examples, it is important to consider Japan's own perspective, both in terms of its domestic politics and regional economic strategies, in order to understand its choices. …" @default.
• W2587858556 created "2017-02-24" @default.
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• W2587858556 date "2016-05-01" @default.
• W2587858556 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2587858556 title "At the crossroads : the TPP, AIIB, and Japan's foreign economic strategy" @default.
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