FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2590245087> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2590245087 abstract "In Defense of Psychological Essentialism Fei Xu & Mijke Rhemtulla fei@psych.ubc.ca, mijke@psych.ubc.ca Department of Psychology, 2136 West Mall University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C., Canada V6T 1Z4 Abstract This paper attempts another defense of psychological essentialism (Strevens, 2000, 2001; Ahn, Kalish, Gelman, Medin, Luhman, Atran, Coley & Shafto, 2001). Using evidence from adults’ and children’s understanding of artifact concepts, we argue that the notion of essence does play a role in everyday reasoning and inference. Furthermore, there is also some corroborating evidence from the biological domain, contra Strevens. Keywords: psychological essentialism, concepts, artifact concepts. A recent exchange between Strevens (2000, 2001) and Ahn et al. (2001) has forced both psychologists and philosophers to take a closer look at the very idea of “psychological essentialism.” Strevens (2000) laid out clearly the three versions of psychological essentialism as well as his alternative minimal hypothesis. All three versions of psychological essentialism posit essences at the center of children and adults’ representational scheme for making inferences about observable properties of natural kinds. The minimal hypothesis suggests, contra psychological essentialism, that the notion of essence does not play a role in our everyday inferences. Instead, Strevens argued that K-laws, i.e., kind-based causal laws that guide our inferences about observable properties, are enough to back our inferences about kind membership. That is, to make inferences about tiger membership, one needs only know that being a tiger gives rise to tiger-properties such as stripes and ferocity, independent of any tiger-essence that may or may not exist. We agree with many of the arguments made in Ahn et al. (2001) and we echo some of them below. This paper attempts another defense of psychological essentialism. Using evidence from the understanding of artifact concepts, we argue that 1) one source of evidence – data on the understanding of artifact concepts by adults and children – may support the idea that essences do enter into our daily reasoning and judgment, 2) the fact that children may show understanding of essences of artifact kinds earlier than natural kinds strongly suggests that human beings have a natural inclination to look for essences, and 3) the evidence against the use of essences in reasoning about biological kinds may not be as strong as Strevens suggests. Inspired by the exchange between Strevens and Ahn et al., we also suggest that empirical investigations of the nature of kind concepts and psychological essentialism may take a different, more direct route. The key claim in Strevens (2000) is that although representationally we may posit an ‘essence box’ (“essence of tigerhood”) between category identity (“being a tiger”) and observable properties (“ferocity” and “stripes”), as far as psychological processes like categorization and inferences are concerned, the notion of essence does not play a role at all. Inasmuch as our reasoning goes like this: That thing is an X, therefore it must have X essence, therefore it shows X- properties, Strevens argues that we may as well get rid of the middle step, thus, “That thing is an X, therefore it has X-properties.” Patterns of categorization and inferences can all be explained in terms of K-laws: Our understanding that kinds are causally connected with observable surface properties dictates our categorization and inference patterns. This is all the machinery we need. Let’s forget about essences as playing any explanatory role in our everyday reasoning. We do, however, need some way of getting to the first inference, “that thing is an X.” Advocates of psychological essentialism would suggest that some observable properties (e.g., large, four-legged object capable of self-generated motion; roaring) lead to the inference that this thing is a tiger with tiger essence and other properties such as ferocity and stripes would follow. According to Strevens, the first set of observable properties would lead to the inference that this thing is a tiger, and given this kind membership" @default.
• W2590245087 created "2017-03-03" @default.
• W2590245087 creator A5059550585 @default.
• W2590245087 creator A5078197358 @default.
• W2590245087 date "2005-01-01" @default.
• W2590245087 modified "2023-09-23" @default.
• W2590245087 title "In Defense of Psychological Essentialism" @default.
• W2590245087 cites W1546829786 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W1600764354 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W1982464741 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W1997162444 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W1999100266 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W1999794183 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W2011813507 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W2080883898 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W2124326341 @default.
• W2590245087 cites W2159662734 @default.
• W2590245087 hasPublicationYear "2005" @default.
• W2590245087 type Work @default.
• W2590245087 sameAs 2590245087 @default.
• W2590245087 citedByCount "4" @default.
• W2590245087 countsByYear W25902450872012 @default.
• W2590245087 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2590245087 hasAuthorship W2590245087A5059550585 @default.
• W2590245087 hasAuthorship W2590245087A5078197358 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C111472728 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C144024400 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C153683151 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C15744967 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C169760540 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C182744844 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C19165224 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C2776214188 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C2779010991 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C75795011 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConcept C77805123 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C111472728 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C138885662 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C144024400 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C153683151 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C15744967 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C169760540 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C182744844 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C19165224 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C2776214188 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C2779010991 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C75795011 @default.
• W2590245087 hasConceptScore W2590245087C77805123 @default.
• W2590245087 hasIssue "27" @default.
• W2590245087 hasLocation W25902450871 @default.
• W2590245087 hasOpenAccess W2590245087 @default.
• W2590245087 hasPrimaryLocation W25902450871 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W1484914558 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W1546829786 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W173585401 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W1999100266 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2059169710 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2061614434 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2072773104 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2085307946 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2127214494 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2136920094 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2297589040 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2309887509 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2327436443 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2492881290 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2532277187 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2586196558 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2587702440 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2767793669 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W2810985737 @default.
• W2590245087 hasRelatedWork W35852269 @default.
• W2590245087 hasVolume "27" @default.
• W2590245087 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2590245087 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2590245087 magId "2590245087" @default.
• W2590245087 workType "article" @default.