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• W2595584298 abstract "IntroductionThe November 26, 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai was an eye opening experience for many in the public safety community and signaled a new wave of small-arms attacks that has continued steadily for the past seven years.1 The main question from the aftermath of the attack is still relevant today. How do a small number of terrorist operatives run a disciplined, coordinated, and sustained attack on a large metropolitan area with virtual impunity? The short answer was, and still is, technology. The situational use of cell phones and other low-fi tools gave the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jamaat ul Dawa (JuD) attackers detailed information about their targets before the attack and a sustained tactical advantage during the attack.2 This essay will analyze the use of technology in the Mumbai attack, and will conclude with a set of lessons learned and recommendations for practitioners moving forward.BackgroundThis essay is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of the social and political climate that led to the attacks, but rather to review the use of technology during the attack itself, and to provide recommendations for practitioners to mitigate or prevent another Mumbai. For a more thorough background see Christine Fair's analysis in her testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection.3 Having said that, in order to provide a foundation for the overall analysis, it is necessary first to review how the attackers planned, acquired, and used technology during the lead up to the Mumbai attack.PreparationTo overcome a militarily superior adversary during a terrorist or guerrilla style operation, it is essential for the attackers to capitalize on the element of surprise. To maximize that advantage during this event, planners from the LeT and JuD determined that their operators would require advanced situational awareness; handlers in Pakistan would need to study their targets meticulously beforehand and find a way to feed the attackers real-time information during the event itself.David Headley (aka Daood Gilani) was tapped to accomplish this task. In the months leading up to the attack, Headley visited Mumbai five times to collect video, photographs, and GPS locations of key targets.4 The most valuable of his visits was used to map the landing site. By mapping the landing site in advance via Google Earth, Headley allowed the attackers to enter India at a predetermined site where he knew they would face limited resistance.5 It is clear that David Headley's use of everyday technology (Google Earth, handheld camera, etc.) helped him avoid detection, but how was he able to acquire such in-depth intelligence without any red flags being raised on the front end? Again, the answer lies in how the LeT and JuD acquired their technology and the kinds of technology they used.How the Terrorists Acquired TechnologyThe consumerization of technology in Southern Asia has not only allowed the cities of Bangalore and Mumbai to become regional silicon valleys, but has also increased the access to information and communications technologies for criminals and terrorists. Hasan Gafoor, Mumbai's police commissioner, provided an excellent summary following the attacks. Once complicated technologies, including GPS systems and satellite phones have become simpler to operate, terrorists, like everyone else, have become adept at using them.6 Basically, the Mumbai attackers were able to avoid detection because the tools that they used- GPS markers, Google Earth, camera phones, and cable television-are virtually impossible for public safety officials to track and limit.The only exception to their reliance on low-fi tools was the operative's choice of phones. Analysts found out rather quickly during the attack that the on-the-ground managers and remote planners were masking their locations. …" @default.
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• W2595584298 date "2015-01-01" @default.
• W2595584298 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2595584298 title "The continued relevance of the November 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack: countering new attacks with old lessons." @default.
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