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• W2596719019 abstract "INTRODUCTIONAdopted at the end of 2006-by far Iraq's bloodiest year-the troop surge marked a major shift in the George W. Bush administration's Iraq strategy. Indeed, the Iraq Body Count (IBC) project, which prefers to rely on confirmed media reports rather than studies extrapolating death tolls based on relatively small samples, estimates that there were 27,850 civilian deaths in 2006, compared with just 3,576 in 2010.1 One analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded that by November 2006, conditions on the ground resembled anarchy and civil war.2 It was around this time that two competing strains of thought on what change of course should be implemented were circulating among U.S. officials.Both schools identified the root problem as a sharply escalating level of violence owing to the growing adoption of what the Iraq Study Group's (ISG) report termed sectarian identities.3 This referred to the heavy fighting taking place between Sunni and Shi'i militias- -especially in Baghdad and other mixed ethnoreligious towns-resulting in around 180 attacks per day on American forces during October 2006 (largely coming from Sunni insurgents). 4 Examples of active militant groups from that period include al-Qa'ida on the Sunni side and Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades on the Shi'i side.5 The latter is affiliated with a pro-Iranian party once called the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in However, the name was later changed to the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq due to fears of stirring up suspicions among Iraqis that the party was an Iranian client.Overviewing developments on the ground in Iraq, the ISG recommended a gradual withdrawal to remove all U.S. troops from the country by 2008, while affirming that simply pulling out would likely increase the security vacuum and embolden al-Qa'ida. Thus, the report further advised a policy one might call Iraqization, 6 whereby responsibility for maintaining order in secured areas would steadily be handed over to the Iraqi army and police. In addition, the authors urged the United States to adopt an intense, multilateral diplomatic approach-even going so far as to counsel cooperation with Syria and Iran and redoubling efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict-in order to stabilize the country.7At the same time, one point strongly emphasized by the study was a belief on the authors' part that increasing troop numbers would probably not succeed in reducing the level of violence in As the report puts it, Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation[It] might temporarily help limit violence in a highly localized area. However, past experience indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved to another area.8Owing to its suggestions on multilateral diplomacy in particular, the ISG came under heavy criticism. For example, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) issued a rival report entitled, Choosing Victory: A Plan for Success in Iraq. Like the ISG, the AEI analysis did not deny the problem of sectarianism. Instead, it advised an increase in troop levels (specifically seven army brigades and Marine Corps regiments 9 ), focusing primarily on Baghdad, as part of a suggested shift toward counterinsurgency (COIN) tactics. These tactics entailed a recommended ratio of one soldier for every 40 or 50 inhabitants 10 and a dramatic increase in reconstruction aid to secure the population's trust in the government and coalition forces.11The Bush administration ultimately rejected the ISG's plans, opting instead for an approach broadly in line with the AEI's recommendations. Five additional army brigades were deployed primarily around Baghdad (although one of these brigades, the 4th Brigade of the 2nd Infantry Division, was sent to Diyala Province in April 2007), and a small number of extra troops were stationed in Anbar Province, a hotspot of Sunni insurgent activity. …" @default.
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• W2596719019 date "2011-12-01" @default.
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• W2596719019 title "Assessing the Surge in Iraq" @default.
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