FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W2598865166> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W2598865166 abstract "Executive pay has been rising silently in past decades across the globe, with more expression in the US, but increasingly in the UK and Europe (Pryce et al, 2010; IPS, 2010; ILO, 2008; EPI, 2007;).The relation between executive pay and corporate performance has never been as questionable as it is today. The sub-prime crisis and the financial and economic collapse that follow brought this relation to enormous scrutiny by the media, academics and notably by regulatory bodies. Empirical studies (Supanvanij, 2008; Baum, Sarver and Strickland, 2004) and reports of official bodies (EU Commission, 2011; FCIR, 2011; Hutton, 2011) and broader consultation like the one conducted by BIS (2011), all have shown and confirmed that this relation that justifies executive compensation levels is flawed. This suggests that the underpinning theories, notably the agency theory, socio-economic (Fulmer, 2009; Kakabadse et al, 2004) and the stakeholder theory (Pryce et al, 2010) need to be re-examined.In the Portuguese case there are not any studies that allow for comparing with international trends. However, Portuguese media (Expresso, 2011) has published a number of articles criticizing the enormous amounts of money paid to executives (particularly in public companies or companies where government holds a golden share) in the middle of a recession and in a period where Portugal was seen as the next country to need bail-out cash to survive.Interestingly this trend seems to be seen right across the developed countries regardless of corporate governance traditions being shareholder or stakeholder oriented. In response to the enormous public scrutiny and signs of shareholder activism, regulatory bodies right across the developed world issued new codes of corporate governance (AFG, 2011; SEV, 2011; EU Commission; 2011; Coffee, 2010; FCR, 2010; CMVM, 2010) with a great emphasis on board evaluation, shareholder “say on pay” and in some cases, mandatory disclosure of ratio of CEO pay to median employee earnings. Interestingly, and despite similar trends and levels of compensation in Portugal, the CMVM (2010) regulations, has not included most of the measures neither pushed for more disclosure on pay multiples and government has done little to improve corporate governance and levels of executive pay in public companies. This paper aims at examining current trends in executive compensation and theories that seem to justify them and to analyse the different solutions found by regulatory bodies to enforce greater transparency and accountability of corporate boards. It finishes with some questions that need answer regarding the impact of current trends on company performance and wider society." @default.
• W2598865166 created "2017-04-07" @default.
• W2598865166 creator A5054101585 @default.
• W2598865166 date "2014-04-04" @default.
• W2598865166 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W2598865166 title "Executive compensation and company performance: solutions found by recent corporate governance codes, the case of Portugal and wider issues" @default.
• W2598865166 doi "https://doi.org/10.26537/iirh.v0i3.1836" @default.
• W2598865166 hasPublicationYear "2014" @default.
• W2598865166 type Work @default.
• W2598865166 sameAs 2598865166 @default.
• W2598865166 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W2598865166 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W2598865166 hasAuthorship W2598865166A5054101585 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C138885662 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C151392489 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C187736073 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C201305675 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C2776050585 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C2778137410 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConcept C41895202 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C120757647 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C121955636 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C138885662 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C151392489 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C162324750 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C17744445 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C187736073 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C199539241 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C201305675 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C2776050585 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C2778137410 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C39389867 @default.
• W2598865166 hasConceptScore W2598865166C41895202 @default.
• W2598865166 hasLocation W25988651661 @default.
• W2598865166 hasOpenAccess W2598865166 @default.
• W2598865166 hasPrimaryLocation W25988651661 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W1494766843 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W1608577056 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W1783173008 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W1848359433 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2051113704 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2096090612 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2257748091 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2555940871 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2604657116 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2604943024 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2735379307 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2922366558 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W3122233738 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W3122950682 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W3123853369 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W3125430873 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W3125461378 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W3165802894 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W350135510 @default.
• W2598865166 hasRelatedWork W2184992204 @default.
• W2598865166 isParatext "false" @default.
• W2598865166 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W2598865166 magId "2598865166" @default.
• W2598865166 workType "article" @default.