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• W2604964944 abstract "THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF DISCOMFORT: RICHARD RORTY AND PRAGMATISM 0 VER THE LAST twenty years, one of the most consistently incisive critics of traditional Anglo-American philosophy has been Richard Rorty. Few contemporary writers can match the vigor, breadth, and intelligence of his books and articles, even as few readers can accept the radicality of the views they express. Rorty disturbs and astonishes like spring weather. His pages mount like cumulus clouds in our intellectual sky, saturated by the past and promising (ambiguously) either to irrigate or to inundate the present fields of our culture. Almost everybody complains about him, but can anything be done? This essay is an attempt to come to grips with aat least part of Rorty's multi-faceted and troubling corpus. His diagnosis of the root problems of epistemology and their larger significance (or insignificance) for Western intellectual life is often brilliant, but I shall argue that his prescription for the future is unattractive. His uncompromising war on dogmatism is based on a rejection of conventional notions of objective truth and metaphysical comfort and is presented in the name of human freedom. It represents, however , a potentially disastrous kind of pragmatism which can be criticized on both theoretical and practical grounds. Of the two, the practical considerations may perhaps be the more telling. I. The Problems of Reading Rorty In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty evaluates modern philosophy's comon self-understanding.1 One as1 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). ~70 RICHARD RORTY AND PRAGMATISM 271 sumed occupation of the discipline, on his view, is the discovery of the foundations of knowledge and thus the validation or invalidation of specific claims to know made in such various fields as science, ethics, art, and religion. Philosophy can claim to take the measure of these other areas of intellectual life because it claims to understand the nature of the mind and its capacity for accurate representation of reality. Philosophy can claim to be foundational with respect to the rest of culture because it claims to encompass the rest of culture, because it claims to know better than science and religion, for instance, what communion with reality they can and cannot attain to. Or so many modern philosophers would (perhaps only implicitly) believe. Rorty suggests that this conception of philosophy stems largely from intellectual developments beginning in the 17th Century, and in this vein he isolates three key contributions: (1) Descartes's idea of the mind as a separate substance, the inner workings of which are uniquely knowable to itself; (2) Locke's idea that a theory of knowledge is both necessary and possible on the basis of an understanding of the mind and how it works; and (3) Kant's idea that philosophy both can and should provide other fields with overarching canons of reason by dissecting a priori the structure of reason itself. These three contributions to modern philosophy's self-image are interrelated but nonetheless distinguishable. Each played its own crucial part in suggesting a foundation for that discipline , philosophy, which claimed to be foundational for all others. Over against this common picture of philosophy and its proper labors stand Rorty's heroes: Wittgenstein, Heidegger , and Dewey. These three men agree, in Rorty's estimation , that the picture (common to Descartes, Locke, and Kant) of knowledge as needing certain foundations and of the mind as locus of privileged epistemic processes, needs to be abandoned. They agree that both epistemology and metaphysics can and should be set aside as possible disciplines 272 TIMOTHY P. JACKSON in the name of a therapeutic form of life and a postmodernist self-image.2 It is this deconstructive, therapeutic line that Rorty wishes to champion. Philosophy should no longer conceive of itself as underwriting links between the human mind and the objective world; we have no access to the objective world as it is in itself; so most of traditional epistemology is misguided. Rorty characterizes his efforts as more akin to moral surusion than rigorous argument, claiming that the epistemological positions with which he takes exception are immune to such argument but objectionable (or at least optional) even so..." @default.
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• W2604964944 date "1987-01-01" @default.
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• W2604964944 title "The Theory and Practice of Discomfort: Richard Rorty and Pragmatism" @default.
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• W2604964944 doi "https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.1987.0031" @default.
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