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• W2606320688 abstract "The Republican Party presidential candidate was criticized this past spring for repeatedly saying that if elected he would be willing to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. While this became ample fodder for news broadcasts and social media, one should not disparage the value of direct contact and negotiation with the top leader of North Korea. Unlike other countries, in North Korea if the top leader makes a decision in a public manner, then the lower echelons of leadership must fall into line.We should remember that former President Jimmy Carter met Kim Il Sung in 1994 in the conviction that it would be a mistake for the U.S. not to negotiate with the main leader of an adversarial and despised nation who alone could resolve a serious issue. Although Carter went to Pyongyang as a private citizen, North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung received him almost as if he were the sitting president. Also, President Bill Clinton wanted to go to Pyongyang before the end of his term in January 2001 (and after meeting Vice Marshal Jo Myong-rok, the North's number two, in the White House in October 2000) but was unable to because of 36 days of uncertainty as to the winner of the 2000 presidential election and due to the fact the U.S. had not successfully concluded negotiations on a missile agreement with the North.As a former president, Clinton finally met Kim Jong Il in August 2009 in the process of retrieving two American journalists detained by the North. When he then reported to President Obama about his recent trip to the North in the Situation Room in the White House, it was about as close as the Obama administration got to senior-level negotiation with the North. Otherwise, there have been nearly eight years of strategic patience. There were some Track II dialogues; a few well-known North Korea experts spent extended time in Pyongyang; and yes, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper went to Pyongyang in November 2014 to retrieve two more American detainees-but nothing like from mid-2005 when Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill at least had ongoing dialogue with his mid-level counterparts from the North.Of course, government-to-government contact on the bureaucratic level is vital and necessary. But probably more than any other country, North Korea's regime dynamics do not work like the rest of the world. North Korea is a country run as a family dynasty. When Kim Jong Un publicly makes a major decision, there can be no outward dissent among the elite. Bureaucratic politics are always present in North Korea, but a decision made by the top leader is not subject to challenge by his subordinates.After the Seventh Korean Workers Party Congress held in May 2016, Kim Jong Un is more secure than ever in his leadership. This is a very good argument for senior-level engagement by the Obama administration or the next administration, whether Republican or Democratic.In 2005, after the September 19th Joint Statement, my colleagues in Washington articulated three main principles that should undergird American efforts to engage and negotiate with North Korea. These principles were based on significant contact with senior North Korean officials since the early 1990s. While that was 11 years ago, and it can be argued much has changed since then, these principles seem no less relevant today than they were a decade ago. I have adapted them below:1.North Korea insists that for its society's political culture, senior-level engagement is first needed to resolve the nuclear issue. Through meetings between the top DPRK leader and a senior U.S. leader (i.e., the President or his/her authorized senior representative like the Secretary of State), a relationship can be made and general agreement reached. Detailed talks at lower levels can then proceed based on the framework established at the top. When the necessary trust is established with the top leader himself and he publicly gives his word, then, in DPRK political culture, he must fulfill what he promised because his word signifies the utmost commitment to his people, which he cannot break. …" @default.
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• W2606320688 date "2016-09-01" @default.
• W2606320688 modified "2023-09-24" @default.
• W2606320688 title "On a U.S. President Meeting Kim Jong Un: The Importance of Senior-Level Engagement" @default.
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