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• W2616193187 abstract "PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE IN THIS ESSAY I discuss the concepts of prudence and conscience and I am particularly concerned to show that they are not the same. That is, prudence and conscience are not synonyms. Such a claim must, of course, be made within the context of established usage, and my appeal throughout is to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas where we find consolidated and clarified two quite disparate historical streams. There is little need to remind ourselves of the important role which appeals to conscience play in our moral discourse. Freedom of conscience, the obligation to follow the dictates of one's conscience, the duty we have to form a correct consciencethese are commonplaces and, like so many other commonplaces , they embody uncommonly weighty truths. The term prudence, on the other hand, has fallen on bad days. We are not likely to praise prudent men, because we associate the prudential with calculative self-interest or, worse, with insurance . And even if we are willing to distinguish the vice of gambling from the virtue of insurance, prudence is not likely to seem a virtue to us. However, in order to catch the flavor that prudentia had for the Latins and phron.esis had for the Greeks, we need only invoke the image of the wise man, the man who humanely and sensitively makes those choices constitutive of a character we can regard as paradigmatic. To act well and wisely out of an abiding state of character, on the one hand, to follow one's conscience, on the other-surely few would find such topics unimportant for moral philosophy. As for Aquinas's treatment of them, we must, of course, be prepared for historical complications. Thomas wrote at a point of confluence of a number of traditions and his thought is, sometimes deceptively, expressed in available categories which 291 RALPH MCINERNY do not on the face of it go easily together. On the matter of prudence, it is comparatively easy to drive his teaching back to its sources in Aristotle, but what he has to say on conscience is said under another influence. It is undeniable, moreover, that there are obvious similarities between his remarks on prudence and on conscience, similarities which can suggest that the terms were effectively synonymous and that his employment of both has historical rather than doctrinal importance . So perceptive a student of Aquinas as Josef Pieper, for example, takes prudence and conscience to be the same for St. Thomas. The living unity, incidentally, of synderesis and prudence is nothing less than the thing we commonly call conscience. Prudence, or rather perfected practical reason which has developed into prudence , is distinct from synderesis in that it applies to specific situations. We may, if we will, call it the situation conscience. Just as the understanding of principles is necessary to specific knowledge, so natural conscience is the prerequisite and the soil for the concrete decisions of the situation conscience, and in these decisions natural conscience first comes to a definite realization . It is well, therefore, to remember, as we consider the foregoing and the following comments, that the word conscience is intimately related to and well-nigh interchangeable with the word prudence. 1 This passage introduces a number of points to which we shall be turning, but perhaps by saying a thing or two now of synderesis we can grasp the nature of the well-nigh interchangeability that Pieper is proposing. Synderesis is the habit of the first principles of practical reason; that is, its content is what Aquinas calls natural law. We could say, therefore, that synderesis and natural law are well-nigh interchangeable with one another and, indeed, that the two are interchangeable with what Thomas has to say of man's ultimate end. Nonetheless, though both prudence and conscience presuppose synderesis and natural law, though both apply it to concrete situations, they are far from being interchangeable. They are, however, in many ways intimately related. 1 Josef Pieper, Prudence, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), pp. 26-7. PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE 293 The plan of my remarks is this. I shall begin with a treatment of prudence or practical wisdom, and I shall get at..." @default.
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• W2616193187 title "Prudence and Conscience" @default.
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