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• W2621708723 abstract "Where is Causality? Amal Guha (guha@dsi.cnrs.fr) LIMSI, BP.133, 91403 Orsay cedex France Abstract It is still not known how to define causality, although its importance has much been stressed in psychology, including text comprehension. The example of gravitation is presented, showing that causality has a surprisingly variable definition. The distinction between epistemological, ontological, and psychological questionings is proposed, in order to clarify earlier theoretical contributions about causality. Then the way causality was considered by works in text comprehension is briefly presented. The evolution of the field brings forth the need to define clearly causality. Recent works in the psychology of text comprehension, focusing on perception, have common grounds of study with philosophical ontology. relations (whatever it is) is a very changing thing, and this may help convincing us that causality is far from being captured by psychology as a stable thing whose properties can be defined in general (so for psychology in particular). Then three types of causal relation are proposed, clarifying the nature of studies on causation. Classifying this way may help to “tidy up” this huge problem: it can be distinguished between epistemological, ontological, and psychological causalities, although problems are almost always , by authors who claim dealing with causality in general. This section concludes that the main question about causation, for both philosophy and psychology, is whether causal relations are (for what we can know) real (objective), or mental (the result of a judgement). We then move on to the way text comprehension theories dealt with causality. We conclude by showing why it is an issue for psychology to deal with the question of what causality is. Keywords Causality; philosophy; ontology; epistemology; text comprehension; causal 1. Evolution of the idea of causality attribution; Consider an elementary example. Let me drop (stop holding) a stone in the air, without moving. It will surely fall to the ground. What’s the cause of this fall? It’s likely that you’ll agree with me that gravitation force caused the stone to fall. The stone fell because of gravitation, when I stopped holding it. This idea seems quite common, but it has not always been. Not only because the theory of gravitation was not always known, but because gravitation force did not always seem the cause of anything to intuition. Indeed, Newton himself, in his Principia Mathematica (in 1687), asserted that his theory said in no case what the cause of movements was. He writes: “I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from the phenomena, and I frame no hypothesis”. Rather than understanding his discoveries as causal explanations, he takes them as descriptions of phenomena, which do not unveil their “occult” causes: “Truth appearing to us by Phaenomena, though their Causes be not yet discover’d.” (Opticks book III, part one). The operational value of his theory was admitted quite fast, but in a Cartesian context, in which only movements and contacts between material bodies were admitted as causal explanations, the principle of gravity (or that of magnetic field) didn’t seem intelligible to contemporary physicists (including Newton himself). Mechanics was just liberated from the scholastic occult qualities, since Galileo and Descartes; and any idea of a distant action seemed an obscurantist regression. According to Liebnitz, “Gravity must be a scholastic occult quality, or the effect of a miracle” (Henry, 1988). Newton replies : “For these [the active principles he used] are manifest qualities, and their causes only are occult” (Henry, 1988). The very idea of a distant action of a body on an other one, without intermediary contact forces, was unacceptable (for the following generation also : on Euler, see.Wilson, 1992). Modern science progressively included in causal comprehension the “mathematical comprehension” of phenomena (Auroux & Weil, 1992). In other words, the scientific commonsense, followed by the vulgar one, finally accepted as causal or explicative a mathematical description. Earlier in the history of science, mathematics were limited to describing phenomena, addressing the question “how?” rather than the question “why?”. Introduction Is causality an objective relation between things, or is it rather in our heads, our judgments (as far as we can know)? The aim of this paper is to stress and discuss this important question of philosophy. It has become very acute in psychology, as text comprehension has moved its focus from the question “How do we represent things? (e.g. propositions, frames, macro- or microstructure, like in Van Dijk & Kintsch, 1983) to the question “what are the things we represent? (e.g. places, people, time, like in Zwaan, Langston, & Graesser, 1995, or Radvansky, Spieler, & Zacks, 1993). While reading, causal relations is an important thing we monitor (Trabasso & Van den Broek, 1985; Van den Broek, 1988; Zwaan, 1999; Singer & Ferreira, 1983). But their definition is still very disputed (Child, 1994) Einhorn & Hogarth (1986) mentioned the relative independence of various areas dealing with the topic of causality: developmental psychology (Piaget, 1971, Lecuyer, Pecheux, & Streri, 1994), perception and learning (Michotte, 1958, 1962), social psychology (Heider, 1958), including attribution (Hewstone, 1989), text comprehension (Trabasso, Secco, & Van den Broek, 1984). They acknowledged the fact that “the definition and meaning of cause have been debated for centuries”. It seems timely to prolong the very complete reviews of Einhorn & Hogarth (1986) and of White (1990), because dealing with the nature of things reported by text is now a subject for the field of text comprehension, and earlier reviews presented different views on the nature of causality and the stakes it presents for the field of text comprehension. This matter is all the more acute since Barsalou (1999) popularized the idea of perceptive components of the mental representation. Causal reasonning, as mentioned by Dague, Kayser, Levy, & Nazarenko (2004) , has deep roots in our cognitive functioning, and defining causality is a very present problem. The first section presents the example of Newton’s gravitation: the history of this theory’s reception shows that what makes causal" @default.
• W2621708723 created "2017-06-15" @default.
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• W2621708723 date "2006-01-01" @default.
• W2621708723 modified "2023-09-22" @default.
• W2621708723 title "Where is Causality" @default.
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