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• W266673260 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION The investigations of the 9/11 terrorist attacks highlighted a series of lapses in intelligence-sharing within the federal government regarding terrorist operations. One area closely examined by Congress,1 the judiciary,2 and many legal and political commentators3 is the appropriate scope of intelligence collection within the United States concerning foreign threats to the nation's (foreign intelligence).4 Domestic intelligence collection is a particularly complex sphere of national security as gathering intelligence on American soil requires balancing the privacy rights of individuals guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment against the nation's need to protect itself. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) governs the conduct of electronic surveillance and physical searches carried out for foreign intelligence purposes within the United States.5 FISA establishes procedures for collecting foreign intelligence information, which are parallel to, and independent of, the conventional law enforcement channels used to secure judicial approval for searches and electronic surveillance.6 Under FISA, federal investigators submit applications for foreign intelligence surveillance to a secret court that exists for the sole of reviewing government requests to gather information pursuant to the statute.7 Prior to 2002, the courts (including the FISA court) only authorized searches and/or surveillance under FISA where collecting foreign intelligence information was the purpose of the investigation.8 This primary test was intended to facilitate the collection of foreign intelligence and limit the use of FISA as an end-run around obtaining a normal search warrant.9 Enforcing the primary test required courts to discern whether an investigation was conducted primarily for intelligence collection or for law enforcement purposes.10 Repeated judicial inquiries into the motives behind FISA investigations eventually led the Justice Department to establish formal procedures for handling FISA information to ensure that such investigations were not being used to pursue criminal targets.11 After the 9/11 attacks, the Patriot Act amended several sections of FISA.12 Most notably, the Patriot Act allows FISA investigations where collecting foreign intelligence is a significant purpose of the collection effort.13 In 2002, the reach of FISA was expanded even further when the FISA Court of Review struck down the primary test altogether.14 After this decision, the government could collect foreign intelligence for use as evidence in a criminal prosecution.15 The new FISA regime shifts surveillance requests away from the Fourth Amendment scrutiny of Article III judges and into the hands of the Justice Department and the secret FISA tribunal. Concededly, balancing the government's need to protect the country from further terrorist attacks with the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of privacy is not an easy task. A new FISA regime that incorporates the Patriot Act amendments need not, however, discard twenty-five years of judicial analysis regarding the proper role of FISA-derived evidence in criminal prosecutions. It is essential that courts rethink the primary doctrine in a manner that effectuates the Patriot Act's of ensuring better intelligencesharing. Part II of this Note describes the evolution of the executive power to collect foreign intelligence from the earliest days of the Republic through the Congressional response to 9/11. Part III analyzes the decision of the FISA Court of Review to interpret the original 1978 FISA statute so broadly as to render unnecessary the changes implemented by Congress in the Patriot Act. Part IV proposes that courts should closely scrutinize government attempts to introduce FISA-derived evidence in criminal prosecutions. Such scrutiny is necessary because the present system inadequately protects individuals from unreasonable searches, as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. …" @default.
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• W266673260 date "2005-10-01" @default.
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• W266673260 title "The Revamped FISA: Striking a Better Balance between the Government's Need to Protect Itself and the 4th Amendment" @default.
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