FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W270893342> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W270893342 startingPage "1383" @default.
• W270893342 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION bankruptcy of the Enron Corporation in December of 2001 sent shock waves throughout the country that forced both Wall Street and the average investor to rethink our system of corporate governance.1 WorldCom, the second-largest long distance carrier in the United States, topped Enron by filing an even larger bankruptcy in 2002 with pre-petition assets estimated at staggering $103,914,000,000.2 Although these were two of the largest bankruptcy filings in United States history, Enron and WorldCom were merely the tip of the iceberg. Similar scandals at Adelphia Communications, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, HealthSouth, Qwest, Rite Aid, Tyco, and Xerox represent a national deluge of corporate malfeasance.3 The particulars of each case are unique, but certain elements remain constant: massive accounting fraud, insider trading, influence-peddling, dubious tax avoidance schemes, outrageous perks for insiders, and complicity by overcompensated directors.4 Over half of American families now invest directly or indirectly in the stock market.5 When companies such as Enron and WorldCom go bankrupt, it is the stockholders of these corporations who generally stand to lose the most as residual claimants of economically moribund corporations. In the three years since the [Enron and Worldcom] scandals broke, nearly one thousand publicly held corporations restated their finances in order to stave off lawsuits, triggering staggering seven trillion dollar devaluation in the stock markets.6 How, then, can our system of corporate governance be reformed-a system that has allowed officers and directors of corporations to perpetrate fraud so pervasive as to send some of America's largest corporations into bankruptcy? Although the public has looked largely to lawmakers to achieve corporate reform, other entities have undertaken reform as well. These reforms include increased scrutiny of corporate directors' actions,7 bolstered requirements calling for boards of directors of companies listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ to be more independent,8 and higher degree of scrutiny from state agencies.9 reform has primarily focused on correcting loopholes exploited by companies like Enron and WorldCom to perpetuate fraud.10 What the reform has not done, however, is change our system of corporate governance in way that allows corporate constituencies to monitor or address wrongdoing by management before damage is done to corporation. True reform to our system of corporate governance is best directed at the state level: In our federal system of corporate law, state governments set the rules governing the relationships among the primary participants in the corporate enterprise: directors, officers and investors.11 States have the ability to enact statutes and develop common law that can be characterized as stockholder, management, or even creditor-friendly. Yet, perverse incentives may hamper states' efforts in achieving meaningful corporate governance reform. Traditional scholarship asserts that our system of corporate governance is largely product of competition between states that were either in race to the bottom12 or race to the top13 in terms of establishing systems of corporate governance designed to attract greater number of corporate charters. These corporate charters are attractive to states because corporations pay franchise taxes and other fees to the states in which they incorporate, generating important tax revenue.14 Race to the bottom theorists posit that our system of corporate governance is biased in favor of corporate management.15 Race to the top proponents argue that the corporate-stockholder relationship is defined by the market, bringing the relationship into natural equilibrium.16 Although this debate has ebbed and flowed, what is not debatable is where the vast majority of corporate charters are held. Delaware is the state of choice for incorporation, as shown by the fact that nearly 400,000 American corporations are chartered there. …" @default.
• W270893342 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W270893342 creator A5073986225 @default.
• W270893342 date "2006-05-01" @default.
• W270893342 modified "2023-09-28" @default.
• W270893342 title "Realigning the Corporate-Stockholder Relationship: Facilitating Stockholder Communications during Active Proxy Solicitations" @default.
• W270893342 hasPublicationYear "2006" @default.
• W270893342 type Work @default.
• W270893342 sameAs 270893342 @default.
• W270893342 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W270893342 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W270893342 hasAuthorship W270893342A5073986225 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C10138342 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C120757647 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C121955636 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C144133560 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C2776697845 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C2777639076 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C2778348171 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C2779103253 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C39389867 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C504631918 @default.
• W270893342 hasConcept C80515813 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C10138342 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C120757647 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C121955636 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C144133560 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C162324750 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C17744445 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C199539241 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C2776697845 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C2777639076 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C2778348171 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C2779103253 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C39389867 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C504631918 @default.
• W270893342 hasConceptScore W270893342C80515813 @default.
• W270893342 hasIssue "4" @default.
• W270893342 hasLocation W2708933421 @default.
• W270893342 hasOpenAccess W270893342 @default.
• W270893342 hasPrimaryLocation W2708933421 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W1511808561 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W1517261502 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W1606103603 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W1947840742 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W1981143527 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2009342931 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W206329309 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2121872766 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2151465622 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2467288978 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2494508961 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2621117735 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W2737053789 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W3121920402 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W3122209109 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W3123909526 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W3125428437 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W3125461378 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W350135510 @default.
• W270893342 hasRelatedWork W66739812 @default.
• W270893342 hasVolume "59" @default.
• W270893342 isParatext "false" @default.
• W270893342 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W270893342 magId "270893342" @default.
• W270893342 workType "article" @default.