FRINK Linked Data Fragments server

Matches in SemOpenAlex for { <https://semopenalex.org/work/W271608237> ?p ?o ?g. }

• W271608237 startingPage "331" @default.
• W271608237 abstract "I. INTRODUCTION 331 II. BACKGROUND: THE CANON, THE DOCTRINES AND THE LANDSCAPE OF MODERN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE 335 A. A Brief History of the Solicitation Canon 335 B. The First Amendment and Judicial Campaign Finance 337 C. Tumey v. Ohio and the Due Process Right to an Adjudicator Free from Pecuniary Interest 341 D. The cases After Tumey: Defining the Scope of the Doctrine 342 E. The Landscape of Modern Judicial Campaign Finance 344 III. THE SOLICITATION CANON AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 347 A. The Constitutional Standard 347 B. Impartiality as Compelling Interest 348 C. The Appearance of Impartiality as Compelling Interest 352 IV. MODERN JUDICIAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE DUE PROCESS PROBLEM 354 A. Applying Tumey to the Judicial Campaign Contribution Context 354 B. Due Process as Compelling Interest for First Amendment Purposes?..... 357 C. State-Driven Solutions to the Due Process Problem 359 D. Available Federal Remedies 361 V. CONCLUSION 362 I. INTRODUCTION The cost of winning judicial election has risen dramatically in recent years, to the point that critical state supreme court race may now cost more than most campaigns for the U.S. Senate.1 At the same time, interest group attention to these races has soared, as concern over tort reform has lead groups on both sides of the issue to escalate their election advocacy spending.2 Although voluminous commentary has addressed both the policy problems and constitutional issues surrounding the regulation of campaign finance in the legislative and executive arenas, comparatively little has been written about the unique problems that arise in the regulation of judicial election fundraising. The United States is unique among constitutional democracies in that it requires majority of its judges to stand for election in order to maintain their positions on the bench.3 A majority of both state appellate and state trial judges are elected nationwide.4 Currently, thirty-nine states require their judges to submit to some form of elections.5 One outgrowth of the states' preference for judicial elections is the requirement that judges and judicial candidates must raise substantial amounts of money in order to attain or retain judicial office.6 Dependence upon donor generosity may undermine the impartiality of judges who face future elections, when those judges try cases that involve the donors as parties, or when interests or issues important to the donors are at stake.7 The American Bar Association, which has long opposed judicial elections,8 has promulgated model regulations of judicial conduct on several occasions; the most recent version is the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, first published in 1990.9 The Model Code seeks, among other goals, to control the bias that flows from the financial relationship between judges and their campaign contributors.10 One provision of the Model Code, known throughout this Comment as the Solicitation Canon, bans judges or judicial candidates from personally soliciting donations to their campaigns. The Solicitation Canon states that a candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign contributions or personally solicit publicly stated support.12 The Canon existed in relatively similar form from its origins in the 1972 Code of Judicial Conduct to its present form in the 1990 Model Code.n It has been adopted, with minor variations, in the vast majority of states that have judicial elections.14 During the three decades since its initial promulgation, judicial candidates challenged the Canon's constitutionality under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment15 twice, once in state court and once in federal court, and both times it was upheld. …" @default.
• W271608237 created "2016-06-24" @default.
• W271608237 creator A5029460808 @default.
• W271608237 date "2007-01-01" @default.
• W271608237 modified "2023-09-27" @default.
• W271608237 title "Free Speech and Due Process Problems in the Regulation and Financing of Judicial Election Campaigns" @default.
• W271608237 hasPublicationYear "2007" @default.
• W271608237 type Work @default.
• W271608237 sameAs 271608237 @default.
• W271608237 citedByCount "0" @default.
• W271608237 crossrefType "journal-article" @default.
• W271608237 hasAuthorship W271608237A5029460808 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C151730666 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C162324750 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C17744445 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C190253527 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C199539241 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2776211767 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2776512386 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2778272461 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2778803647 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2779343474 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2780564088 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C2780883770 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C48764862 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C83009810 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C86803240 @default.
• W271608237 hasConcept C94625758 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C151730666 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C162324750 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C17744445 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C190253527 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C199539241 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2776211767 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2776512386 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2778272461 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2778803647 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2779343474 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2780564088 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C2780883770 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C48764862 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C83009810 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C86803240 @default.
• W271608237 hasConceptScore W271608237C94625758 @default.
• W271608237 hasIssue "1" @default.
• W271608237 hasLocation W2716082371 @default.
• W271608237 hasOpenAccess W271608237 @default.
• W271608237 hasPrimaryLocation W2716082371 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W1495961293 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W1496613442 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W1497924087 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W1530432750 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W1554818968 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W1558714623 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W2056839415 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W2191251542 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W2258843442 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W2274490166 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W2289457372 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W287129675 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3043799726 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3123118139 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3123545559 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3123742768 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3124989556 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3125956200 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W3156552619 @default.
• W271608237 hasRelatedWork W90428933 @default.
• W271608237 hasVolume "101" @default.
• W271608237 isParatext "false" @default.
• W271608237 isRetracted "false" @default.
• W271608237 magId "271608237" @default.
• W271608237 workType "article" @default.